Microfinance and rating by Steffensen, Alla
 Masterthesis 
 
Microfinance and Rating 
 
 
By Alla Steffensen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The masterthesis is carried out as a part of the education at Agder University College and is 
therefore approved as such. However, this does not imply that the College answers for the 
methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn.  
 
 
Supervisor: 
Roy Mersland 
 
 
Agder University, Kristiansand 
 
 
June 1st 2008 
 
 
  1
Preface 
 
Taking a master degree at Agder University has been an interesting and enriching experience. 
The study has come to an end and the only master thesis is left. 
 
Konrad Adenauer once said: “We all live under the same sky, but we don’t all have the same 
horizon” (Quotegarden, 2007). Learning about how financial services can help the poor and 
the vulnerable opened a whole new perspective for me. It was the Nobel Peace Prize 2006 that 
first brought microfinance to my attention. It was fascinating to see how financial and social 
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rating industry. He kindly agreed to be my supervisor and was very helpful in guiding me 
through this process. Furthermore, Roy Mersland developed the dataset used in this study. It 
was a big honor and pleasure to be working with him.  
 
I would also like to thank my husband for his inspiration and support. Thank you very much 
for taking care of our junior. 
 
 
 
 
Lyngdal, June 1st 2008 
 
 
 
_________________ 
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Abstract 
 
This master thesis starts by introducing the concept of microfinance. It shows that MFI rating 
is an important tool in achieving transparency. 
  
The study attempts to determine the relationship between social and financial indicators and 
the MFI rating grade. These indicators are chosen based on previous studies on ratings and 
microfinance. The data comes from ratings reports performed by five major MFI rating 
agencies: MicroRate, Planet Rating, Microfinanza, Crisil and M-Cril. Data transformation 
was used to achieve normal distribution of the variables. 
 
The empirical research was carried out using multiple regression analysis. A few equations 
were tested to find the optimal model. The findings of the study revealed that MFI size, risk, 
profitability, productivity and efficiency are significant determinants of rating grades. Larger 
and less riskier MFI tend to get better rating grades. Increasing profitability, productivity and 
efficiency of the MFI will increase the rating grade. No significant relationship between the 
social performance of MFI and the rating grade assigned was found. Control variables were 
used to account for the possible affect of MFI region, motive (profit or not) and agency that 
performed the rating. Only one out of six regions was significant in explaining the model - 
Europe and Central Asia. It didn’t matter whether MFI was a non-profit organization or not. 
The grade was, however, affected by the agency that performed the rating. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past years more and more attention has been given to microfinance. Year 2005 was 
announced as international year of microcredit. In 2006 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
Grameen Bank and it’s founder Muhammad Yunus. Today MFIs can be found all over the 
world providing financial services to the poor. To many of us, the concept of microfinance is 
still rather new. 
  
With the microfinance industry evolving and maturing, the need for transparency is 
increasing. Ratings are a part of a transparency sequence. They help MFIs to get funds, 
benchmark their position, compare it with peers and improve performance. Some MFI are, 
however, reluctant, of being rated in fear of getting a bad grade. The paper discusses the 
benefits of ratings and shows that achieving transparency in the microfinance industry 
benefits all. 
 
This paper describes microfinance and the microfinance rating industry. It shows that ratings 
are an important step on the way to transparency. Little research has been done on the rating 
of MFIs. Based on previous studies, several financial and social indicators are chosen as 
determinants of ratings. The empirical research aims to identify the relationship, if such 
exists, between the rating grade assigned to MFI and its size, risk, productivity and efficiency, 
profitability and social performance. 
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2. Microfinance Overview 
 
2.1. The “Unbanked” 
 
Access to financial services is a part of our everyday life: we get our salary to a bank account, 
use it to pay bills, own a debit or a credit card (or often both), have a savings account, a loan 
and insurance. Now think if all this was unavailable… I know that for me, daily 
transactions/chores would become much more time consuming, inconvenient and some 
simply impossible (like buying a house). 
 
While the majority of the households in Europe (except Eastern Europe) have a bank account, 
the situation differs dramatically in developing countries (Figure 2.1): 
 
Figure 2.1. Household Share with a Bank Account 
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Peria, 2005 
 
The share of households with a bank account is highest for Western and Northern Europe 
(0,916 to 0,991) and decreases slightly for Southern Europe (0,789 for Greece and 0,704 for 
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Italy). A bit less than half of households in Colombia and Brazil have a bank account. 
Furthermore, the number of households with a bank account drops to only 0,002 for Bulgaria 
or 0,047 for Nicaragua. 
 
As we see, access to financial services is limited in many developing countries. There is a 
number of reasons why so many people are “unbanked”. The poor may simply find the 
products unattractive. Banks may be not willing to provide services due to high transaction 
costs and high risk. Even issues like culture and gender can limit the access to financial 
services (The Blue Book, 2006) But one thing is clear: “poor and low-income people want 
financial services that match their needs to better manage their households and businesses” 
(The Blue Book, 2006). 
 
 
2.2. The Clients 
 
Microfinance aims to provide financial services to the poor. Research shows that typical 
microfinance clients come from moderately poor and vulnerable to non-poor households with 
some from extreme-poor households. Destitute households remain still unreached (Helms, 
2006).  
 
Figure 2.2 How Poor Are Microfinance Clients? 
 
             Poverty line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cohen, 2003 
 
Microfinance clients are typically self-employed farmers, shopkeepers, vendors, service 
providers etc. (Mixmarket, 2008). Often they lack collateral and can’t apply for a bank loan.  
Destitute        Extreme        Moderate        Vulnerable        Non-Poor         Wealthy 
            Poor      Poor            Non-Poor 
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Grameen Bank has a special program developed for beggars. They can apply for interest-free 
loans. The repayment installments are very small – for ex. 3,4 US cents per week (Rutherford, 
2003). The program aims to improve living conditions of the beggars and the destitute by 
providing access to financial services.  
 
 
2.3. Inclusive Financial Services 
 
Previously microfinance (then microcredit) was about providing loans. But the poor showed 
that there exists a demand for a variety of financial services. That’s what modern 
microfinance is about: 
 
providing inclusive financial services such as loans, savings, money transfer and insurance to 
the poor. 
 
Brett Matthews (Matthews, ) provides a description of typical financial goals for poor 
households and the microfinance products that fit those needs. As we see, access to loans 
enables poor families to buy working capital and livestock, housing and helps in emergency 
situations. Deposit services enable customers to save for food, healthcare, transportation, 
livestock, education, pension etc. No less important is the ability to send money. While richer 
households usually use money transfer to pay bills (The Blue Book, 2006), poor households 
use remittances (migrant workers sending money home) or send money to (Helms, 2006). 
Poor families are more vulnerable to tragedies and disasters. Death or sickness of a 
breadwinner in the family can put the household in a serious financial trouble, while situation 
would be different if family had insurance. 
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2.4. History of Microfinance 
 
We will look into the history of microfinance. The first concepts behind it have existed for 
decades and can be found already in Europe in the Middle Ages (figure 2.4). 
 
In 1462 a Franciscan monk in Perousa, Italy established the first public pawnshops in 
Perousa, Italy. The "mont-de-pietes" or "Banks of Pity" were organized as a charity institution 
and provided loans to the poor without charging interest (Expressloan, 2006).  
 
Jonathan Swift founded the Irish Loan Fund System in the beginning of 1700s. The system 
was characterized by providing small funds locally. The repayment rates were high and it 
grew to 300 funds by the early 1840s. It was one of the largest financial organizations in 
Ireland and at its peak 20% of Irish households had loans there annually (Eh, 2008). 
 
The first credit cooperatives were organized in Germany by Herman Schulze-Delitzsch and 
Friedrich Raiffeisen. Herman Schulze-Delitzsch’s purpose was to provide cheaper bread (by 
organizing a cooperative-owned mill and bakery) and Friedrich Raiffeisen’s was to enable 
farmers to a credit. These unions spread furthers through Germany, Europe and reached 
Canada in 1900 (NCUA, 2008). 
 
 Various types of formal saving and credit institutions began to appear in Latin America in 
1900s. Though the early European immigrants introduced them, they were government or 
private owned and not by the clients as in Europe (Britannica, 2008). 
   
After the World War II countries focused on developing the agricultural sector. State owned 
development finance institutions and farmers’ cooperatives provided loans to the farmers. 
Providers were heavily subsidized and used below market interest rates. The demand for such 
loans increased a lot and loans ended up more and more often in the hands of government 
favored or better-off farmers. The repayment rates fell dramatically, since customers started to 
feel that these loans were more as a “gift” (Morduch, 2005). 
 
In 1970s Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, ACCION International in Latin America and Self- 
Employed Women’s Association Bank in India start providing small credits to the poor. This 
is the beginning of the modern microcredit. 
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Figure 2.4 The History of Microfinance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Helms, 2006 
Since the beginning of time… 
Informal saving and credit groups have operated for centuries across the developing 
world. 
Middle Ages 
In Europe an Italian monk created the first official pawnshop in 1462 to counter usury 
practices. 
In 1515 Pope Leon X authorized pawnshops to charge interest to cover their operating 
costs. 
1700s 
Jonathan Swift initiates the Irish Loan Fund System, which provides small loans to poor 
farmers who have no collateral. At its peak, it is lending to 20% of all Irish households 
annually. 
1800s 
The concept of the financial cooperative is developed by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen 
and his supporters in Germany. From 1865, the cooperative movement expands rapidly 
within Germany and other countries in Europe, North America, and eventually 
developing countries. 
Early 1900s 
Adaptations of these models begin to appear in parts of rural Latin America. 
1950-1970 
Efforts to expand access to agricultural credit use state-owned development financial 
institutions, or farmers’ cooperatives to channel concessional loans and on-lend to 
customers at below-market interest rates. These development banks lose most of all of 
their capital because their subsidized lending rates cannot cover their costs, including the 
cost of massive default. 
Early 1970s 
Experimental programs extend tiny loans to groups of poor women to invest in micro-
business, and microcredit is born. Early pioneers include Grameen Bank; ACCION 
International and the Self-Employed Women’s Association Bank 
1980s 
Microcredit programs throughout the world improve on original methodologies. 
Microlenders, such as Bank Rakayat Indonesia defy conventional wisdom about 
financing the poor. Cost-recovery interest rates and high repayments permit them to 
achieve long-term sustainability and reach large numbers of clients. 
Early 1900s 
The term “microcredit” begins to be replaced by “microfinance”, which includes not only 
credit, but also saving and other services, such as insurance and money transfers. 
Today 
The borders between traditional microfinance and the larger financial system are starting 
to blur. In some countries, banks and other commercial actors are entering microfinance. 
Increasing emphasis is placed on building entire financial systems that work for the poor. 
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 In 1980s microcredit programs showed that: 
1) repayments rates (especially for women) are better than in commercial banks 
2) MFI can cover their costs 
This meant that MFI don’t have to depend on subsidies or government help. Bank Rakayat 
Indonesia (BRI) focused on covering its costs. Today BRI provides financial services to 30 
million poor villagers. 
 
Microcredit programs continue to expand in 1990s. The focus is being broadened from 
providing loans to also giving the poor a possibility to save, buy insurance, transfer and 
receive money. While MFI offer a whole range of microfinance services they also start 
thinking more about organization form. Earlier MFI were typically non-profit organizations, 
but more organizations are being organized or changed to for-profit MFI. Organization forms 
will be described later in this paper. 
 
 
2.5. Grameen Bank 
 
Grameen Bank is among pioneers in microfinance Furthermore, it’s probably the best know 
MFI. Therefore I would like to dedicate a special attention and tell its story. Information on 
the history is taken from Grameen Bank’s webpage (Grameen, 2008). 
  
Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971. Over 80 % of the population were 
reported living in poverty in 1973-1974 (Morduch, 2005). Population suffers not only from 
famine, but also from shark moneylenders charging 10% interest a week. Professor 
Mohammed Yunus decides to start a radical experiment. One of his students makes a list with 
total of 42 people from a nearby village of Jobra that need totally less than 27 US$ to start for 
themselves (Grameen, 2008). Mohammed Yunus borrows his own money to the villagers. Not 
only are they able to improve their situation and start business, but they also repay well. Later 
Mohammed Yunus managed to get a loan and started to provide small loans to villagers. They 
were not given as a big sum, but as frequent small amounts. Grameen bank (Grameen = 
village) opened its official entity in 1983. 
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One of the innovations of Grameen Bank is group lending. Clients are organized in groups of 
5. First only 2 members of the group get a credit, after that is repaid – the next 2 and the last 
5th person at the end. The system encourages social responsibility by letting the whole group 
be responsible for all members. Failing to repay by one of the members excludes the whole 
group from future borrowing. 
 
Mohammed Yunus noticed very fast that most of bank’s clients were women. They were the 
ones spending more on family and business than for personal wishes. There was however a 
challenge – in Muslim culture women were kept at home. Microcredit enabled women to get 
more power in making decisions at home and allowed them to handle money. 
 
In my opinion, the success of Grameen Bank can easily be understood by looking at the 
membership growth. In 1976 there were only 10 members in the bank, while as of March 
2008 the number reached 7 463 566 customers (out of which 96,8 % are women).  
 
Figure 2.5 Membership Growth in Grameen Bank, 1976-march 2008 
 
Source: Grameen, 2008. 
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Grameen Bank provides a complex of microfinance services such as loans (basic, flexible, 
educational, housing, etc), deposits, insurance and even scholarships. The number of 
outstanding loans is 559,79 million US$ and recovery rate is 98,22%. 81 574 villages have 
access to financial services through Grameen Bank according to Grameen monthly update, 
march 2008 (Grameen, 2008). 
 
 
2.6. Nobel Peace Prize 2006 
 
The Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee has awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 to 
Muhammad Yunus (Bangladesh) and his foundation - Grameen Bank (Dhaka, Bangladesh). 
The press release stated that: 
 
”Muhammad Yunus has shown himself to be a leader who has managed to translate visions 
into practical action for the benefit of millions of people, not only in Bangladesh, but also in 
many other countries. Loans to poor people without any financial security had appeared to be 
an impossible idea. From modest beginnings three decades ago, Yunus has, first and foremost 
through Grameen Bank, developed micro-credit into an ever more important instrument in the 
struggle against poverty.” (Nobelprize, 2006). 
 
In order to achieve lasting peace, we need to reduce poverty, continued the release. Though 
microfinance alone can’t do it, it is proven to be an effective tool for the economic and social 
development. 
 
 
2.7. Microfinance Today 
 
As of 2004, almost 100 million people are loan client at MFIs (The Blue Book, 2006). The 
table below shows that these institutions provide around 600 million savings accounts and 
more than 150 million loans (The Blue Book, 2006). Postal banks account for more than a 
half of all savings accounts, while state banks and MFIs account for one fifth each. Rural 
banks, co-ops and credit unions share the remaining ~10%. Situation in loans is quite 
different. State banks and MFI are the main providers with respectively 62% and 33%. 
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Figure 2.6. Alternative Financial Institution Activity in Developing Countries  
 
 
 
Source: CGAP, The Blue Book, 2006 
 
Now let’s look how these loans and saving accounts are distributed geographically. Asia and 
the Pacific stand for 83% of all accounts, more than a half of these accounts is concentrated in 
China and India. Middle East and North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central 
Asia and Latin America and Caribbean account each for only 2-8%. 
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Figure 2.7 Accounts by Region 
 
Source: Helms, 2006 
 
CGAP (Helms, 2006) provides an interesting report on each of these regions. The report 
includes general characteristics of the microfinance sector, trends and some statistics. 
Microfinance sectors differ by focus (social or commercial), organization forms, loan size etc. 
I found it quite interesting that Asia had the lowest cost per borrower in the US$ - 50,0 
compared to 176,1 in Latin America, 237.7 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 309,8 in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. The microfinance industry in the latter was characterized by higher loan 
sizes (due to higher income and education). Asia was characterized by strong social 
orientation. 
 
Testing the empirical evidence, we will account for the possible effect of these regions in our 
model (chapter 10). 
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3. Providers of financial services 
 
3.1. Informal 
 
Many poor people can’t access financial services from local banks because due to high costs 
or lack of collateral. For many of them family and friends become the most common provider 
of financial services. They can help you out in difficult situations but their resources are 
limited. Moneylenders have existed long in most of the societies. They know the locals and 
understand their situation. Though they can provide you with money when needed, their 
services can be very expensive. For example, poor farmers in India have no other alternative, 
then to get a loan from individual moneylenders at 100 percent interest rate 
(Mukherjee/Bloomberg, 2008). 
 
Pawnbrokers, saving collectors, traders, clubs like ROSCAs and ASCAs are other sources of 
financial sources. Most of us are familiar with pawnbrokers, they offer loans in exchange for 
valuable items. Saving collectors provide a safe hiding place for you money. But instead of 
paying the clients interest rate (like commercial banks do), they charge them interest rates for 
keeping their money safe. According to CGAP (Helms, 2006) these fees can be up to 30 
percent annualized interest rate in India. Traders and input suppliers are common loan 
providers for farmers. They offer fertilizers, seeds, money in exchange for repayment after 
crops (Helms, 2006). 
 
ROSCAs (rotating savings and credit association) consist of group of people who gather in 
order to borrow and save together. They usually consist of 10-30 members who save regularly 
over a period of time together. The money is then distributed between the members, so that 
each participant gets a loan during the lifetime of a group. ASCAs (accumulating savings and 
credit associations) offer more flexibility to its clients, but require more management in 
return. These two types of groups are simple, efficient and transparent, but have a major 
drawback: cheating. Roy Mersland (Mersland, 2007) during his presentation on ROSCAs 
informed that more than 95 percent of participants have experienced losses. Among other 
problems he pointed out inflexibility, elite capture and exclusion of vulnerable members. 
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3.2. Member-based 
 
These consist of Self-Help Groups, FSAs (financial service associations), CVECAs (Self-
Managed Village Savings and Credit Banks) and financial cooperatives (Helms, 2006). Self-
Help Groups is the most common form of microfinance in India (Nair, 2005). They are 
similar to ROSCAs and ASCAs, but these groups are also eligible for bank loans, which they 
lend further to their members. Self-help groups reach poorer people and more remote rural 
areas, as well as they have low cost of establishment, but these groups are very fragile 
(Mersland, 2007). FSAs and CVECAs are other hybrid models of member-based groups that 
are used in Africa. 
 
Financial cooperatives offer financial services to their member and are usually ran as non-
profit organizations.  Studies show that member of credit unions account for 72 percent of 
borrowers and 86 percent of depositors in Central Asia (Helms, 2006). It is hard to measure 
whether financial cooperatives reach poorer clients compared to MFIs, but in order to be 
successful they need to be small enough to monitor the members and big enough to ensure 
that no single group dominates (Helms, 2006). 
 
 
3.3. NGOs 
 
NGOs have evolved as an answer to banks that failed to reach poor clients. The Nobel Prize 
Winner 2006 Grameen Money Bank is probably the most well known NGO example 
(presented earlier). It provides services to almost 7,5 million clients in 81 574 villages in 
Bangladesh. (Grameen, 2008). During the last decade, many MFI transform into regulated 
financial institutions (The Blue Book, 2006). Since many NGOs depend on donor funding, 
this would enable them to access more funds and be more efficient. This issue will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
3.4. Formal Financial Institutions 
 
These are profit driven institutions that offer a wide range of financial services to their clients. 
Since they don’t specially target the poor, they don’t tend to reach them. The answer can lie in 
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unsuitable products, high costs or lack of collateral. Among formal providers of financial 
services are different types of banks (state, commercial, rural or community) and non-bank 
financial institutions are. They are profit driven, and may prioritize their financial goals before 
social ones. (Helms, 2006).  
 
Mersland conducted a study on the cost of ownership in MFI and found no support to promote 
for profit institutions at the expense of non-profit ones (Mersland, 2007). A study on MFI 
efficiency (Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, Mar Molinero, 2007) finds that NGO status was 
related to the MFI efficiency. The issue between access to funds and the institution type will 
be discussed more in the next chapter. 
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4. Funding Options 
 
In order to provide financial services MFIs need funds. The range of funding options for 
microfinance stretches from bi- and multilateral donors to commercial investors and domestic 
capital markets. The first ones put more focus on social objectives (welfarists) of the MFI 
while the latter (institutionalists) are more concerned with commercial motivations.  
 
Figure 4.1. The Landscape of Funding Options of Microfinance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: IFI = international financial institutions 
Source: Helms, 2006 
 
The MicroBanking Bulletin provides MFI benchmark tables. The study of 200 MFI in 2003-
2005 shows that the number of financially sustainable MFI has changed from 126 MFI in 
2003 (63%) to 141 in 2004 (70,5%) and to 142 in 2005 (71%) (MicroBanking Bulletin, 2007). 
Though many MFI have proven that it is possible to provide financial services to the poor and 
make money, there are still others who wouldn’t survive without subsidies. 
 
Testing the research model, we’ll account for possible effects of profit and non-profit 
motivation of MFIs. 
 
 
4.1. Donors 
 
Public/ 
Social 
Commercial/
Private 
Bi- and multiratural donors 
IFIs 
Private funds 
Commercial Investors 
Foundations 
Domestic 
capital markets 
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The role of donors has been widely discussed in the microfinance literature. Inefficient and 
badly organized programs can do more harm than good. Such was the evidence in the 
Philippines where heavy subsidies designed to provide access for poor borrowers ended up in 
the hands of favored residents and only worsened income distribution. India’s Integrated 
Rural Development Program (IRDP) is another example of inefficient subsidized credit. The 
program failed due to very low rates, which led to low repayment rates and bad institutional 
performance (Morduch, 2005).  
 
Another study suggests that in order to break even without subsidies in 1985-1996 Grameen 
Bank would have to increase it’s lending rates by 75% (Morduch, 2005).  
 
Liza Valenzuela (ACCION, 2002) studies two questions. What kind of commercial 
institutions should donors support (advantages and disadvantages by peer groups: large 
commercial banks, small banks, state banks, finance companies, and strategic alliances) and 
what kind support is the most appropriate (loan funds, guarantee funds, technical assistance 
and operating expense support). The survey showed that some institutional types might have a 
slight advantage in regards to special objectives (ex. large banks reach the most poorest 
clients for the least investment, small bank reach the most poorest clients, while state banks 
and finance companies reach the highest number of clients). Technical assistance showed to 
be the most fruitful of donor interventions. The author argues that there is clearly a role for 
donors in advancing downscaling efforts. 
 
Main concerns are that by having access to cheap financial funds, MFI are not motivated to 
achieve full financial self-sufficiency and may adjust their programs to please donors. 
Morduch (Morduch, 2005) suggests to use “smart subsidies”. This means subsidies during 
start-up phase of the MFIs, loans that target poorest customers who can’t afford to borrow at 
market rates or subsidize the cost of small loans since they are more costly pr $ lent. 
 
 
4.2. Investors 
 
With time many MFIs expand and need to mobilize more funds.  
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Most of the foreign investments (almost 90%) concentrate on 2 regions: ECA (46%) and LAC 
(42%).  While private investors have invested mostly in LAC, public investors chose to invest 
in ECA. Unfortunately, investors tend to compete for well-established regulated MFI regions 
leaving doubts to whether sufficient market opportunities exist for small funds (CGAP, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.2. Disbursed Foreign Investment (in US$ millions) 
 
 
All Investors 
Region Total $ Total % 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 502,2 46 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 457,9 42 
Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) 62,9 6 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) 35,7 3 
South Asia (SA) 29 3 
Middle East and the North America (MENA) 8,8 1 
TOTAL 1096,5 100 
 
Source: CGAP (2004) 
 
Foreign investments have some downsides. MFI can experience problems coping with foreign 
exchange risks. The other problem that might arise is conflict of interests since investors can 
offer both technical assistance and investments (Helms, 2006). Financial experience, good 
management and negotiating power will help to deal with these risks. 
 
 
4.3. Domestic Capital Markets 
 
The final stages of financial integration (SWWB, 2004) developed by Women’s World 
Banking lies in domestic funding markets. To access these funds MFI highly depend on local 
factors, MFI’s legal structure, require significant regulation and also time. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Stages of Financial Integration 
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     Gradual process highly 
     dependent on local factors 
   and the MFI’s legal structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Time 
    Little to no      Significant 
  regulation required     regulation required 
 
Source: SWWB, 2004 
 
Many MFI work in developing countries with small financial sectors. Small economies of 
scales result in higher transaction costs. Access to financial markets is therefore limited and 
more expensive (The Blue Book, 2006). 
 
Another problem lies on the institutional level. Weak operational capacity and management, 
lack of transparency, governance structure and limited ability to manage risk often 
characterize MFIs (The Blue Book, 2006). Thus investing in MFI might simply be too risky. 
 
There are a couple of interesting issues I came along studying the area: 
1) Lending to MFIs can lower bank’s ratings due to uncollateralized portfolios (The Blue 
Book, 2006) 
2) Banks fear criticism for giving loans at high interests rates to the poor (The Blue Book, 
2006) 
More attention should be given to these problems. Banks should not fear that lending to the 
MFI may harm their reputation. 
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Savings mobilization is another source of funding. One of its strengths is independence from 
external funding. Low cost over time is another advantage (Helms, 2006). Savings 
mobilization requires higher level of integration and regulation. Microfinance industry suffers 
from the lack of transparency. Clients need reliable information in order to deposit their 
money. On the other side, many MFIs are non-regulated and are not allowed by government 
regulations to take deposits from clients.  
 
Bonds issue allows the MFI to access funds from the domestic capital markets. As we see in 
our figure, this method is a gradual process that requires a high level of integration. Therefore 
it is not very common.  Increased transparency would benefit MFIs in getting funds and local 
investors in making investments decisions.  
 
Equity markets require the highest level of regulation and financial integration. I won’t go 
further into it. Local investors and MFI would benefit from higher transparency. 
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5. Microfinance Rating 
 
5.1. Credit Risk Ratings? 
 
Credit risk ratings date back to 1900s when John Moody&Company published its first manual 
with “information and statistics on stocks and bonds”. The use of ratings has grown and two 
decades later Moody’s rated almost all of the US bonds (Moodys, 2008).  
 
Credit risk ratings provide information on credit worthiness of a company and the ability to 
meet its debt obligations. Based on fundamental credit analysis a rating agency gives a grade 
from highest credit quality to the lowest (Rating Fund, 2008). 
 
Rating reports are useful to investors and companies as well as securities or governments 
being rated. While they use their rating reports to facilitate investments, investors use reports 
to decide what kind of risk they are willing to take and whether they want to invest 
(Investorpedia, 2008). Moody’s, Standard and Poors and Fitch IBCA are the leading rating 
agencies in the investment world. 
 
 
5.2. Microfinance Ratings 
 
Though MFI existed since 1970’s, the first MFI specialized rating agency did not appear until 
two decades later. There are two main types of microfinance ratings: credit risk ratings and 
global risk assessments (also known as performance assessments).  As mentioned above, 
credit risk ratings focus on creditworthiness and the ability of an MFI to meet its financial 
commitments. 
 
Global risk assessments “put more weight on operational elements such as appropriateness of 
lending methodologies and governance issues and allow comparability mainly to other MFIs”. 
(Navajas, Suaznabar, 2006). 
 
Microfinance Rating Market Outlook (Rating Fund, 2006) published by CGAP provides a 
comparison of credit risk ratings and global risk assessments by regions.  
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Table 5.l. Global risk assessments and credit risk ratings by region, 2006  
 
 
Region Global risk 
assessments 
Credit risk ratings 
LAC  83  125 (47 mandatory) 
Asia  108  3 (2 mandatory)  
SSA  30  0  
EECA  37  0  
MENA  17  0  
Total  275  128 (49 mandatory)  
 
a 
Mandatory risk ratings include multiple ratings of the same MFI in one year. 
 
Source: Rating Fund, 2006 
 
From the table above we can see that over half of all microfinance ratings in 2006 were 
conducted in LAC (30% of all global risk assessments and 98% of all credit risk ratings). This 
is consequent with the facts that Latin American microfinance market is mature and was the 
first one to start using microfinance ratings. 
 
Though global risk assessments are created to fit the purposes of MFI, credit risk ratings 
dominate the region (60% of all ratings). This can be partly explained by the fact that some 
Latin America countries have mandatory regulations for MFI. For example in Bolivia (36 out 
of 47 mandatory ratings in LAC were done there) MFI that want to be regulated by the 
superintendent of banks must be rated by an authorized rating agency (Rating Fund, 2006). 
 
Asia is the second largest market for ratings (28%) and the largest market for global risk 
assessments (39%). In 1994-2005 India was the leading country in the region accounting for 
79% of credit risk ratings and global risk assessments performed (Rating Fund, 2006).  SSA, 
EECA and MENA rating markets are smaller and represent respectively 11%, 13% and 6% of 
all global assessments and none of the credit risk ratings. 
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Let’s take a look at the microfinance rating market today (table 5.2). Though microfinance 
rating industry is quite young, it has evolved and expanded during the last years. 1809 ratings 
and assessments have been completed in the period 1997-2006. Not only has the demand for 
new ratings grown, but also so has the demand for repeat ratings and assessments. This means 
that organizations that have been rated before found rating useful and wanted to update their 
rating.  
 
Table 5.2. Microfinance rating industry overview  
 
 
 
1997–2006 2005 2006  
Total number of ratings and assessments completed 1,809 327 403  
First-time ratings or assessments  721 109 165  
Repeat ratings or assessments  1,088 218 238  
Global risk assessments  1,188 217 275  
Credit risk ratings  621 110 128  
Mandatory credit risk ratings  314 44 48  
Proportion of Rating Fund co-financed ratings  NA5 22% 24%  
 
Source: Rating Fund, 2006 
 
Global risk assessments dominate with 66% out of total ratings and assessments completed, 
leaving 34% to credit risk ratings (right above half of which where mandatory). 
 
Though many MFI might find the ratings very expensive, the MFI can get their ratings co-
financed. 22% of ratings in 2005 and 24% of ratings in 2006 were co-financed by the Rating 
Fund, an organization created to stimulate the demand for MFI ratings/assessments and 
improve transparency. These issues will be addressed more closely later in the paper. 
 
Rating agencies are independent suppliers of microfinance rating services. They have 
developed their own rating methodologies that differ between the agencies. Though some 
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agencies put more weight on some factors compared to the others, the process of a rating 
consists of the following analysis: 
 
Figure 5.1. Microfinance Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rating Fund, 2006 
 
A rating agency starts by studying qualitative aspects such as institutional factors, services, 
clients and the market. It looks at the organization, its history, form of governance, staff etc. 
Then the agency studies clients, services provided (their quality and portfolio quality) and the 
market itself.  
 
The next part is the analysis of quantitative factors. Such analysis of financial and operational 
performance helps the raters to study risks, financing strategy, profitability and efficiency.  
 
Finally the agency compares the strategic positioning with the objectives. The raters also look 
at the market and trends. This type of analysis enables comparison of the MFI within peers 
and the industry. 
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Objectives and benefits 
 
The Rating Fund states that the primary objective of MFI ratings is to facilitate the 
relationship with partners.  
 
Figure 5.2. Objectives and Benefits of Ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rating Fund, 2006 
 
Investors might be reluctant to invest in MFI if they don’t get complete, accurate, reliable and 
standardized information. Some countries (in Latin America and Asia) require mandatory 
rating for MFI fulfilling special requirements. 
 
On the other hand a rating helps the MFI to understand its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Objectives and benefits 
 
Primary objective: facilitate the relationship with partners 
Rating exercise helps the 
MFI understand its 
strengths and 
weaknesses 
Rating report adapted 
to investors’ needs 
Complete accurate, reliable, and 
standardized information 
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Figure 5.3. Benefits of Ratings 
 
The benefits of ratings for MFIs 
Improving Performance Attracting Funders 
 
Managers can use the evaluating process to: 
 
 
 
• focus on how and where to improve 
 
• compare their performance with peers 
 
• evaluate their standing in the microfinans 
industry and set performance targets 
 
Thir party verification of MFI performance 
information and risk management assessment 
allows: 
 
• Investors and donors to judge the relative 
quality of MFIs 
 
• MFIs to earn higher transparency ranking 
on the MIX Market, which links investors 
with MFIs 
 
 
Source: Rating Fund, 2006 
 
Ratings help MFI to improve their performance. Learning about its strengths and weaknesses 
will help the management to focus on the right aspects, set long-term goals and address its 
problem areas.  
 
MFI can compare their performance with peers and the microfinance industry. This can serve 
as an incentive to improve or can help the MFI to benchmark. 
 
Another benefit of rating is to attract funds. Investors and donors require reliable information 
on the MFI performance in order to decide whether to place their money in the MFI. 
Originally MFI ratings were done to satisfy the donors needs. They put more weight on how 
funds are used on special projects and not the institution’s (Rating Fund, 2006). In other 
words, donors focus more on social objectives and outreach (Gutierre-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, 
2007).  
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Investors are more concerned with sustainability. They focus more on financial performance 
and are looking for profitable “social” investments (Rating Fund, 2006).  
 
All ratings co-sponsored by the Rating Fund are public. Though ratings can be used to attract 
funds, many MFI are afraid that a negative rating can do the opposite. Before doing a public 
rating, MFI can use an external source to evaluate them first. This can be an effective way to 
improve the weaknesses, the insiders (managers, staff) might oversee. 
 
5.3. Microfinance Rating Agencies 
 
The microfinance rating market is represented by 15 suppliers of rating services. These 
agencies can be divided into the following categories: specialized agencies; regionally or 
single-country based agencies that rate financial organizations and mainstream credit risk 
rating agencies (Rating Fund, 2008). They provide global risk assessments, credit risk rating 
or both. Table 5.3 provides an overview of five major MFI rating agencies: MicroRate, Planet 
Rating, Microfinanza, Crisil and M-Cril. Information for the table is gathered from agencies’ 
websites and the Rating Fund. 
 
All rating agencies are experienced raters that performed from 180 to 420 ratings. If we take a 
look at geographical coverage, all of them operate globally except for Crisil that performs 
ratings in India. These five agencies use both quantitative and qualitative analysis in 
performing ratings. Planet Rating, Microfinanza and M-Cril value quantitative and qualitative 
analysis similarly (40% and 60%). Crisil bases its ratings slightly more on quantitative 
analysis 45% (thus 65% on qualitative). MicroRate uses qualitative analysis the most 
compared to the other four agencies (70%).   
 
An insight into agencies’ methodology shows that they are not the same. Each agency uses its 
own rating methodology. They include more or less the same aspects and cover institution, its 
risk and financial performance, management, governance. Studies of microfinance 
methodologies (Jardosh 2007, Xavier 2002) show that even if microfinance use the same 
indicators, they may define them differently. Both researchers come to a conclusion that a 
standardized rating system is needed. Another difference is the rating scale. All rating 
agencies use their own rating scale. Use of standardized rating scales would make comparison 
between MFIs easier. 
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6. Theory 
 
6.1. Transparency 
 
According to CGAP, ”transparency is essential if the microfinance industry is to reach scale.” 
(CGAP, 2008). Transparency has two goals: improved MFI performance and 
commercialization of microfinance. Information on MFI’s  performance and comparison with 
peers motives the management to deal with the weaknesses and improve performance. The 
latter can be achieved by providing accurate and reliable information to the funders (CGAP, 
2001). 
 
Ratings are a part of an MFI’s transparency sequence:  
 
Figure 6.1. What Is A Rating? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Rating Fund, 2006  
 
What is a rating? 
 
• Part of an MFI’s transparency sequence 
•  
Collect 
the data 
Equity 
Markets 
Monitor 
and 
Compare 
Analyze and 
understand 
reality behind 
figures 
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MFI starts the transparency sequence by using information systems to collect the data. First 
the data’s integrity is verified within the MFI through internal controls, and then outside the 
organization through external audit.  
Assessments and microfinance ratings help to monitor, compare, analyze and understand the 
gathered information. The MFI can be studied not only based on its own performance, but can 
also be compared to other actors in the industry and can benchmark itself. Further 
governments or other authorities can use these reports for supervision purposes. (CGAP, 
2001). 
 
Accurate and reliable information would benefit all parties. The MFI would be able to identify 
their weaknesses and deal with them. Clients would benefit from knowing about financial 
performance of MFIs. This would give them a clue to whether the MFI is risky and could 
have troubles in meeting its obligations. Investing in a risky MFI could be a threat towards 
deposit’s safety. (Rating Fund, 2006) Some donors and funders can be reluctant about 
investing in unrated MFIs. Transparency would help them to find organizations according to 
their risk profiles. 
 
Mixmarket is a microfinance information platform. It aims to promote transparency. 
Information on MFIs, investors, raters, agencies and advisory firms can be find there. 
Mixmarket publishes information on MFIs, investors, raters, advisory firms etc. (Mixmarket, 
2008). Among other promoters of transparency is the Rating Fund. It does so by co-funding 
rating of the MFI. As a part of the deal, these ratings are available to public through their 
website (Rating Fund, 2008). 
 
 
6.2. Agent theory 
 
Now let’s use the agent theory on the case with MFIs. Agency relationship occurs when one 
party acts on behalf of another. The principal-agent problem assumes that the agent has an 
informational advantage over the principal. The principal compensates the agent to work on 
his behalf, but he is not sure whether the agent advances principal’s goals (Milgrom, 1992). A 
graphical representation can be found below: 
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Figure 6.2. Principal-Agent Problem 
 
Source: Wikipedia, 2008 
 
We can use this model in microfinance on a relationship between donors (principals) and MFI 
managers (agents). Donor provides a subsidy and of course wants the money to be used in a 
best possible way. Manager might have different interests. Since many MFI are unregulated 
and unsupervised, donors can suffer from moral hazard. Microfinance ratings would improve 
the availability of information and reduce information assymetry. 
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7. Previous studies 
 
7.1. Bond ratings 
 
Horrigan 1966 
 
Horrigan was the first one to predict bond ratings. He used regression analysis to find 
independent variables for his equation. Those ratios that had the highest R2 and most 
significant t-statistics were chosen. (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1975). The final independent 
variables used for the study were: subordination, total assets, ratios of working capital over 
sales, net worth over total debt and sales over net worth and net operating profit over sales 
(Ang and Patel, 1975). Horrigan’s model could predict 58% of Moody’s ratings and 52% of 
Standard & Poor’s ratings. 
 
West 1970 
 
West believed that ratings were highly correlated to risk premiums (Ang and Patel, 1975). He 
took another approach and chose determinants of risk premiums from Fisher’s study as 
variables for the model and not financial ratios as Horrigan. West used four independent 
variables: earnings variability, period of solvency, equity to debt ratio and bonds outstanding. 
The model could predict 62% of Moody’s ratings. 
 
Pogue and Soldofsky 1969 
 
Pogue and Soldofsky developed a regression model based again on the financial ratios. They 
identified five independent variables for their study: long-term debt to total assets, net income 
to total assets, coefficient of variation of earnings, total assets and interest over interest 
charge. The model could predict 80% of Moody’s ratings (Ang and Patel, 1975).. 
 
Pinches and Mingo 1973 and 1975 
 
Pinches and Mingo used multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to predict bond ratings. The 
model was based on subordination, size, leverage, long-term and short-term capital intensity, 
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return on investment, earnings stability and debt coverage as main determinants of ratings. 
This model correctly predicted 60% of new ratings. 
A follow up study was performed 2 years later and the model predicted correctly 75% of new 
ratings (source: Ang and Patel, 1975). 
 
Kaplan and Urwitz 1979 
 
Kaplan and Urwitz used probit analysis based on financial ratios and risk measures such as 
interest coverage ratios, capitalization (leverage) ratios, profitability ratio, size variables, 
stability variables and a dummy variable that represented subordination status. The model 
could predict 69% of new  ratings (Ang and Patel, 1975).  
 
Belkaoui 1980 
 
Belakoui used an MDA model including eight independent variables – namely, total assets, 
total debt, long-term debt to total capitalization, short-term debt to total capitalization, current 
ratio, fixed charge coverage ratio, stock price to common equity per share and subordination 
status (Hyunjoon and Zheng, 2004). 
 
 
7.2. Microfinance ratings 
 
Hartarska 2005 
 
Since ratings in microfinance are still rather new, only a few studies were done on rating of 
MFI. The study of Valentina Hartarska suggests that rating may have a potential to impose 
market discipline in microfinance, but not all microfinance rating agencies are the same 
(Hartarska, 2005). 
 
Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Mar Molinero 2005 
 
Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Mar Molinero used Data Envelopment Analysis to 
measure the efficiency of MFI’s (Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, Mar Molinero, 2005). The 
results of the study showed that MFIs efficiency could be explained by four principal 
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components (overall measure of efficiency, NGO status, input choice and output choice). 
Organization type (NGO or non-NGO) and country had also effects on efficiency. 
 
Rosenberg 2005 
 
Rosenberg (Rosenberg, 2005) studied core performance indicators in microfinance. He 
identified five minimum financial performance indicators for retail financial institutions. 
Those are: outreach, depth of outreach, portfolio quality, financial sustainability and 
efficiency. 
 
Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca 2007 
 
Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca studied determinants of MFI ratings.  Their research was 
based on 70 MFI ratings completed by one rating agency - Planet Rating. Factors explaining 
MFI rating were size, profitability, efficiency, risk and social performance of MFIs.  As 
assumed, the results of the study showed positive and significant relationships on rating of 
size, profitability, efficiency of MFI and a negative and significant relationship of risk of MFI. 
However no relationship was found between social performance of MFI and rating assigned 
(Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca, 2007) 
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8. Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis is a statement that explains certain facts or phenomena. Hypothesis consists of a 
null hypothesis (H0) and an alternative hypothesis (H1). A null hypothesis states that any 
effect we state or explain is due to random error (Zikmund 2003, p.44). In this study null 
hypotheses will state that there is no relationship between MFI rating grade and size, risk, 
productivity, efficiency, profitability and social performance of MFI. An alternative 
hypothesis is the opposite of a null hypothesis. In our case hypotheses will state that there is a 
relationship between those variables and will indicate their direction (positive or negative).  
 
Hypothesis testing will help us to find which of the two hypotheses is true. If stated 
relationship exists, then we will reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis. If the relationship will not be found to be true, we will accept the null hypothesis 
and reject the alternative hypothesis. The procedure of hypothesis testing will be described 
more in chapter 11.  
 
Theory and earlier observations will help us to determine our hypotheses. In the previous 
studies on bond ratings financial ratios and risk measures were used as main determinants of 
ratings. In general, the variables that had the highest explanatory power were subordination 
status, size, earnings stability, leverage, earnings coverage of interest and profitability. 
(source: Kaplan&Urwitz, Statistical models of bond ratings, p. 242). These models could 
correctly predict 60-80% of ratings. 
 
Hartarska (Hartarska, 2005) states that microfinance ratings may help to impose market 
discipline. Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca (Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca, 2007) 
study determinants of MFI ratings and constitute that MFI size, risk, profitability, efficiency 
and productivity effect the rating grades. Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Mar Molinero 
(Gutierrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Mar Molinero, 2005) find that NGO-status of MFI and 
the country they operate in effects efficiency. 
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Table 9.1. Hypotheses  
Variable Hypotheses 
Size + 
Risk - 
Efficiency and productivity + 
Profitability + 
Social performance + 
 
 
8.1. Hypothesis 1: Size 
 
Previous studies on bond ratings by Horrigan (1966), Pogue and Soldofsky (1969), Pinches 
and Mingo (1973 and 1975), Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) and Belkaoui (1980) as well as study 
on MFI ratings by Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca (2007) included variables measuring 
size as determinants of ratings. 
Larger MFI should benefit from economies of scales. They are usually better in paying their 
obligations. Larger MFI can adjust better to economical and political changes. Therefore the 
first hypothesis is: 
 
H10: There is no relationship between MFI size and the rating grade. 
H1A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI size and the rating grade. 
 
8.2. Hypothesis 2: Risk 
  
Rating assesses creditworthiness of MFI. A poor rating indicates a higher risk, and thus leads 
investors to require higher interest rates in return. (Wikipedia, 2008; Gutierrez-Nieto & 
Serrano-Cinca, 2007) included risk measures in their studies on ratings. The second 
hypothesis is the following: 
 
H20: There is no relationship between MFI risk and the rating grade. 
H2A: A negative and significant relationship exists between MFI risk and the rating grade. 
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8.3. Hypothesis 3: Efficiency and Productivity 
 
“Efficiency and productivity are performance measures that show how well the institution is 
streamlining its operations” (MicroRate). Productivity refers to measures of output pr unit of 
input. Efficiency goes further and compares production with cost. 
Most of the previous studies on ratings described earlier include these financial ratios in their 
models (see chapter 7). The third hypothesis is: 
 
H30: There is no relationship between MFI efficiency and productivity and the rating grade. 
H3A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI efficiency and productivity 
and the rating grade. 
 
8.4. Hypothesis 4: Profitability 
 
Profitability compares performance in all areas of MFI. The review of previous studies on 
ratings very often includes profitability measures as independent variables in their research 
(see chapter 7). Therefore we expect profitable MFI to be better in meeting their obligations, 
and thus acquire higher rating. The fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
  
H40: There is no relationship between MFI profitability and the rating grade. 
H4A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI profitability and the rating 
grade. 
 
8.5. Hypothesis 5: Social performance 
 
MFIs are organized both as for-profit and non-profit organizations. Therefore MFI include 
some unique features since they can be compared both with financial institutions and NGOs. 
When funding MFIs, donors put more focus on outreach, while investors – on sustainability. 
According to CGAP (Helmst, 2006) all international investors in microfinance “are willing to 
accept a more modest return on their investments in exchange for the social returns generated 
by microfinance”. More outreach often means less sustainability and more risk, thus poorer 
financial performance, which should lead to lower rating. But due to unique nature of MFIs 
(they carry social objectives and missions), a special attention should be given to social 
performance during the rating process. 
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Some studies found a positive relationship between social performance and company 
performance, while Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca (2007) found no relationship between 
financial and social performance of MFIs. 
 
All rating agencies have different methodologies. Some might put more weight on social 
indicators, while others - on financial. Besides all MFI rating agencies claim to evaluate MFIs 
on the institutional level and study its objectives and mission. In this study, rating reports 
from five different rating agencies will be used. I assume that social performance would be an 
important variable to explain the MFI rating grade. Therefore I assume the following 
hypothesis to be: 
 
H50: There is no relationship between MFI social performance and the rating grade. 
H5A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI social performance and the 
rating grade. 
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9. Empirical Research 
 
In this section we describe our empirical study. We start by describing how the data was 
collected. Then we regard the issue of reliability and validity. In section on data preparation 
we tell how information was checked for deviations, wrong entries and missing values. Since 
regression analysis assumes that the variables are normally distributed, some of the variables 
had to be transformed. We discuss data transformation and present the variables.   
 
 
9.1. Data collection 
 
For this study, global risk assessments from five major rating agencies were used. Since not 
all MFIs make their reports available for publicity, the reports available through the 
Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund (later the Rating Fund) were chosen. It is a joint 
initiative started in 2001 between Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and joined in 2005 by the European Union. (Rating Fund, 
2008). The main objectives of the Fund are: 
1) Market-building for MFI rating and assessment services 
2) Improved transparency of MFI financial performance 
In order to do this, the Rating Fund co-finances rating services for MFIs. The rating reports 
that have received subsidies from the fund, are available online. More than 429 reports of 
MFIs worldwide are available to public through fund’s website www.ratingfund.org.  
 
For this study, only global risk assessments were used. They focus not only on 
creditworthiness, but analyze MFI’s global performance (operational and financial, 
management’s capability) (Rating Fund, 2008). Further, only rating reports by five major 
rating agencies, namely - Planet Rating, Microfinanza Srl, MicroRate, Crisil and M-Cril were 
chosen.  
 
Working with rating reports done by different agencies is a challenge due to lack of 
standardization. Previous studies show (Jardosh; Reille, Sananikone & Helms) that 
microfinance rating agencies use different approaches and put more weight on different 
factors. This should, however, have only a minor influence on the database, since 
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“comparison of the methodologies applied by the rating agencies reveal no major differences 
in MFI assessment” (Mersland).. 
 
Another challenge is that rating agencies use different rating scales. This problem was 
eliminated by converting rating scales used in the study into a uniform rating scale developed 
by Roy Mersland (Roy Mersland, Ph.D. student at Agder University). 
 
After these selections, the final dataset contained 290 global risk assessments. The MFIs 
presented were evaluated between 2000 and 2007 and come from 60 different countries. 
Roy Mersland (Roy Mersland, Ph.D. student at Agder University), developed the dataset and 
it was a big honor and pleasure to be working with him. 
 
 
9.2. Reliability and Validity 
 
In order to make a correct study we need to be sure that all data is reliable and valid. 
Reliability refers to the ability to provide consistent free from error results. The ability of a 
measure to measure what it’s designed to measure is called validity (Zikmund, 2003). The 
data in our sample is collected from rating reports. The variables are either given in the report 
or calculated from MFI income statements. The calculations are based on standard financial 
formulas (ex. operating expense ratio, portfolio at risk). Other variables, like for example total 
assets are given in the income statements. This should mean that the scales provide a correct 
measure. Other variables, like for example total assets were given in the report. Since rating 
grades are transformed using a uniform rating scale, a control variable for agency is used in 
the model to control for possible effects.  
 
 
9.3. Data Preparation  
 
Descriptive statistics was used to check for outliers and wrong values. Minimum, maximum 
and mean values for each variable helped to check for deviations. A graph function in SPSS 
was used to build graphs with rating grade and each of the independent variables. All special 
cases were given attention. For example, variable portfolio at risk had 8 measures were the 
value was equal to 0. To make sure that none of this was due to a wrong entry, each variable 
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was checked in the rating reports. Variable average loan outstanding had an unusually high 
value for MFI Rural Finance Corporation. The value was found correct and was a good 
example for the model. Variables that were measured on nominal scales (ex. type, agency) 
were checked for wrong and missing values. The aim was to keep as many cases as possible 
in the dataset. Data transformation helped to deal with some outliers and high deviations. 
Cases with missing values were also excluded. Out of 248 cases the final sample included 229 
cases after data preparation. 
 
9.4. Data Transformation 
 
The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between the MFI rating grade and MFI size, 
risk, profitability, social performance, efficiency and productivity. The model to test 
hypotheses uses multiple regression analysis. It allows analyzing the relationship between two 
or more independent variables on the dependent variable. Regression analysis requires the 
data to be normally distributed: linear, normal and homoscedastic (Wikipedia, 2008).  If the 
variables aren’t normally distributed, the problem can be solved by data transformation. It is 
used to transform data to a format that better supports data analysis (Zikmund 2003). To 
measure if the variables are normally distributed, we will use frequency function in 
descriptive statistics. We will use two indicators: skewness and kurtosis. Skewness measures 
asymmetry of the distribution. Figure below provides an illustration of negative and positive 
skew. Normally distributed values are symmetric with a skewness of 0. As an indicator of 
normal distribution we will use data with a skewness between –0,8 and 0,8 (Wikipedia, 2008). 
 
Figure 9.1. Skewness 
 
Source: Wikipedia, 2008 
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Kurtosis indicates how observations cluster around a central point. Normally distributed data 
has a Kurtosis statistic value of 0. (SPSS Tutorial, Frequencies Statistics). High values 
indicate that more of the variance is caused by extreme deviations. As a rule, we will consider 
the data to be normally distributed with kurtosis in the range of –3 to 3 (Wikipedia, 2008).  
For each of the variables in the regression model, a histogram of frequency distribution was 
constructed. It is a good way to illustrate whether the data is normally distributed. We 
checked for the values of skewness and kurtosis statistic. 
 
 
Several variables were not normally distributed and needed to be transformed. Variables the 
rating grade, operational self-sufficiency and assets rotation showed normal distribution. 
Variables total assets and average loans outstanding had a very high range. Other variables, 
like portfolio at risk and operating expense ratio had to high skewness and kurtosis values. 
Common transformation techniques are square root, logarithm, inverse or power (includes all 
the others and cube root) (Wikipedia). Figure 10.2 provides a graphical illustration of some of 
the techniques. 
 
Figure 9.2. Data Transformation 
   Model        Transformation         Model             Transformation 
 
1) Square Root    4) Reflect and 
          Square Root 
 
 
 
2) Logarithm     5) Reflect and 
          Logarithm  
 
 
3) Inverse     6) Reflect and 
          Inverse 
 
 
Source: PFC, 2005 
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Histograms on frequency distribution done in SPSS showed that some variables were 
positively skewed similar to the first two models. This was also confirmed by too high 
skewness and kurtosis values. These variables were: total assets, portfolio at risk, operating 
expense ratio and loan outstanding average. Square root and logarithm transformations were 
done to transformed the data into a suitable format. For example, variable total assets was 
transformed by taking a natural logarithm of the variable and creating a new variable 
ln_assets. The same procedure was done with average loan outstanding. After the 
transformation the histograms showed normal distribution and the skewness and kurtosis 
values were within the defined range. The new histograms of frequency distribution are 
provided in the next part - description of variables. Tables with skewness and kurtosis statistic 
values after the data transformation are also there. They show that data transformation helped 
to achieve normal distribution of the variables. 
  
9.5. Description of Variables 
Our model consists of one dependent and several independent variables. The dependent (the 
outcome) is a rating grade assigned to the MFI. The independent variables are the predictors 
of the model. We also added some control variables as dummies to capture for possible 
effects of MFI type, region where they operate or the agency that performed rating. All 
variables are summarized in table 10.3. Definitions are based on information from MixMarket 
(Mixmarket, 2008). 
 
Descriptive statistics is used to summarize and describe data. One of the effective ways to 
summarize information is by using frequency distribution (Zikmund, 2003). The histograms 
will provide graphical illustration of that. We will also look at the mean (the arithmetic 
average), the median (the midpoint), the minimum and maximum values.  Since several 
variables were transformed to achieve normal distribution, skewness and kurtosis values will 
be provided. As mentioned earlier, skewness ranging from –0,8 to 0,8 and kurtosis ranging 
from –3,0 to 3,0 will mean that the variable is normally distributed.    
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Table ??. Description of Variables
Variable Definition
Size
Total Assets (tot_assets) Total of all net asset accounts
Risk/Portfolio Quality
Efficiency and Productivity
Operating Expense Ratio (operexp_portf) Operating Expense/ Average Total Assets
Operational Self-sufficiency 
(oper_self_suff)
Financial Revenue (Total)/ (Financial Expense + Loan Loss Provision Expense 
+ Operating Expense)
Profitability
Assets Rotation (assets_rot) Financial Revenue / Total Assets
Social performance
Average Loan balance pr borrower 
(loan_outst_ave) Gross Loan Portfolio / Number of Active Borrowers
Firm controls
Profit motive (non-profit, profit) NGO, COOP - non-profit, others - for profit
Rating Firm (agency) MicroRate, Planet Rating, Microfinanza, Crisil, M-Cril
Country controls
Regions (region) East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
Portfolio at Risk (PAR30) Portfolio at Risk > 30 days/ Gross Loan Portfolio
Table 9.1. Description of Variables 
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9.5.1 Dependent Variable 
 
Rating 
Rating refers to the rating grade assigned to the MFI after a global risk assessment is carried 
out. In our study, reports by 5 major MFI rating agencies have been used. Comparing rating 
grades between the MFI can be a challenge, since the agencies use different scales. To avoid 
the problem, original rating grades assigned by the different agencies were transformed into a 
new scale. The value of a rating grade lies in between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the highest 
rating grade. 
In our sample the minimum rating grade is 0 which is the lowest rating grade possible. The 
maximum grade of 0,8 was given to 8 MFI in our sample, which constitutes 3,5% in our 
sample . The average rating grade for the MFI has a value of 0,452. Figure 9.3  gives us a 
frequency distribution of the variable. It shows normal distribution and skewness of -0,236 
and Kurtosis of -0,454 also confirm this. 
 
Table 9.2 
 Statistics 
 
rategrade-1  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
Mean ,452 
Skewness -,236 
Std. Error of Skewness ,161 
Kurtosis -,454 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,320 
Minimum ,0 
Maximum ,8 
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Figure 9.3 
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9.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
Total assets 
Total assets is the most widely accepted size measure. It represents the total of all net asset 
accounts. 
 Table ?? shows that the values range from 172 203 USD to 143 811 137 USD. The raw data 
is unevenly distributed with a much higher number of MFIs below average. This results in 
skewness of 5,114 and Kurtosis of 32,328. 
 
To avoid this problem, a new variable, natural logarithm of assets, was created. Figure ?? 
shows distribution of ln_assets. The values range from a minimum of 12,06 to a maximum of 
18,78 with a mean of 15,24. Skewness is reduced to 0,175 and Kurtosis to 0,048. This size 
measure is normally distributed and can be used in regression analysis. 
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Figure 9.4 
ln_assets
18,000016,000014,000012,0000
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
30
20
10
0
ln_assets
Mean =15,2361

Std. Dev. =1,1767

N =229
 
 
Table  9.3 
 Statistics 
 
ln_assets  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
Skewness ,175 
Std. Error of Skewness ,161 
Kurtosis ,048 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,320 
 
 
PAR30 
Risk measures are represented by portfolio quality of MFIs. PAR30 is a typical measure of 
portfolio quality. It is calculated by dividing the outstanding balance of all loans over 30 days 
and refinanced loans to total outstanding gross loan portfolio.  
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In our sample raw data was not normally distributed, and square root transformation was used 
to avoid the problem. The minimum value is 0 showing that the portfolio has no outstanding 
balance over 30 days or refinanced loans. The maximum value goes to 0,9950 with a mean of 
0,4103. Table ?? shows that skewness is –0,124 and Kurtosis is 1,322. This indicates that our 
variable is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 9.5 
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Table  9.4 
 Statistics 
 
par30_sqrt2  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
Skewness -,124 
Std. Error of Skewness ,161 
Kurtosis 1,322 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,320 
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Operating Expense Ratio 
This ratio is calculated by dividing operating expenses of the MFI by the average gross 
portfolio. It provides the measure of overall efficiency of a lending institution and is often 
referred to as the efficiency ratio (Performance Indicators, p.16).  
 
For the purpose of the study, raw data had to be transformed by using square root. The 
variables have a minimum of 0,1679 and maximum of 0,9189 and a mean of 0,5023. Figure 
9.6 shows frequency distribution of operating expense ratio in our sample. We can see that 
even after transformation the data is slightly skewed. Skewness of 0,502 confirms this. 
Further the table 9.5 provides a Kurtosis of –0,162. 
 
Figure 9.6 
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Table  9.5 
 Statistics 
 
operexp_portf_sqrt  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
Skewness ,502 
Std. Error of Skewness ,161 
Kurtosis -,162 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,320 
 
 
Assets Rotation  
Profitability indicates the overall performance of the institution. In order to survive in the long 
run, financial institutions need to be profitable. The situation for MFIs is a bit special, since 
many of them are organized as non-profit organizations and concentrate more on social, than 
financial goals.  
Assets rotation is a measure of institution’s profitability. It is calculated by dividing financial 
revenue to total assets.  
 
In our sample the values range from 0,03 to 0,63 with a mean of 0,2655. Figure ?? shows that 
the variable is normally distribution, so no data transformation is needed. Skewness has a 
value of 0,637 and Kurtosis a value of 0,030, which confirms normality. 
 
Table  9.6 
 Statistics 
 
assets_rot  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
Mean ,2655 
Skewness ,637 
Std. Error of Skewness ,161 
Kurtosis ,030 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,320 
Minimum ,03 
Maximum ,63 
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Figure  9.7 
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Operating Self-Sufficiency ratio 
The ratio is calculated by dividing financial revenue to the sum of operating, financial and 
loans loss provision expenses. This ratio captures productivity of the institution. A value 
greater than 1 means that MFI manages to cover their costs from their revenue. 
 
As we see from table ?? operational self-sufficiency ratio goes from 0,1150 to 2,3370. The 
mean is 1,1806. 20% of the MFI have a ratio below 1 and the remaining 80% have a ratio 
above 1. This means that most of the institutions in our sample are able to cover their costs 
from revenue from the loan portfolio.  
 
Skewness is 0,200 and Kurtosis is 1,867 showing that the variable is normally distributed. No 
transformation is necessary and raw data is used in the regression.  
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Figure 9.7 
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Table  9.6 
 
 Statistics 
 
oper_self_sust  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
Skewness ,200 
Std. Error of Skewness ,161 
Kurtosis 1,867 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,320 
 
Average loans outstanding 
This variable is calculated by dividing gross loan portfolio to the number of active borrowers. 
The value provides average size of a loan.  
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While banks focus on capturing wealthy clients with big loan sizes, MFIs aim to serve poor 
clients. These clients don’t have much money, so loan sizes are small. Average loans 
outstanding is a measure of outreach. Smaller loan sizes indicate that institutions reach poorer 
clients.  
 
 
Table  9.7 
 
 
 Statistics 
 
  loan_outst_avg 
ln_loan_outst_
ave 
Valid 227 227 N 
Missing 2 2 
Mean 814,58 6,08 
Skewness 11,529 ,058 
Std. Error of Skewness ,162 ,162 
Kurtosis 156,192 -,256 
Std. Error of Kurtosis ,322 ,322 
Minimum 49 4 
Maximum 24589 10 
 
 
Sample in this study has information on 227 MFIs. The minimum value is 49 USD for 
BANDHAN from India and FOCCAS from Uganda. The maximum value of 24 589 USD is 
for Rural Finance Corporation working in Moldova. This high value can be misleading, since 
it is much higher compared to the rest of the sample (next maximum value is only 4958 
USD). The mean is 814,58 due to the high maximum value, so median of 433 gives a more 
correct picture. With a skewness of 11,529 the data needed to be transformed. Creating a new 
variable did this - ln_loan_outst_ave. Transformed data had a skewness of 0,058 and Kurtosis 
of –0,256. This indicates that the variable is normally distributed and this also can be seen 
from figure 9.8.  
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Figure  9.8 
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Region 
The data in our study represents MFIs from 61 countries all over the world. Region is a 
country control variable. It is divided into 6 dummy variables depending on which region of 
the world the MFI represented: East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. MFI that 
operates in East Asia and the Pacific got a value of 1, while the rest of the variables a value of 
0. The same procedure was done for remaining five variables.  
Table 9.8 shows that almost half of the ratings represent Latin America. Microfinance is well 
developed in Latin America, and that’s where the MFI rating industry first started. Only 5% 
of the ratings represent Middle East and North Africa. 
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Table  9.8 
 Statistics 
 
region  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
 
 region 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 20 8,7 8,7 8,7 
2 44 19,2 19,2 27,9 
3 108 47,2 47,2 75,1 
4 11 4,8 4,8 79,9 
5 14 6,1 6,1 86,0 
6 32 14,0 14,0 100,0 
Valid 
Total 229 100,0 100,0   
 
 
Agency 
 This is a firm control variable representing the agency that performed global risk assessment. 
It consists of five dummy variables: MicroRate, PlanetRating, Microfinanza, Crisil and Mcril. 
If MicroRate performed the rating, dummy MicroRate had a value of 1 and the other variables 
a value of 0. This procedure was done to the rest of the dummy variables. 
 
Table 9.9 shows that 38,9% of the evaluations was performed by Planet Rating; 26,2% by 
Microfinanza; 21,4% by MicroRate; 12,2% by M-Cril and only 1,3% by Crisil. This can be 
explained by the fact that Crisil operates only in South Asia, while the other four agencies 
perform evaluations all over the world. 
 
 
Table  9.9 
 
Statistics 
 
agency  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
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 agency 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 49 21,4 21,4 21,4 
2 89 38,9 38,9 60,3 
3 60 26,2 26,2 86,5 
4 3 1,3 1,3 87,8 
5 28 12,2 12,2 100,0 
Valid 
Total 229 100,0 100,0   
 
Type 
This is a firm control variable. It consists of two dummy variables. NonProfit indicates that 
MFI is a nonprofit organization. It includes MFIs organized as NGOs and cooperatives/credit 
unions. Banks, non-bank financial institutions and other profit driven microfinance providers 
were included in the other dummy variable – Profit. If MFI is organized as a non-profit 
organization, a value of 1 was assigned to it and a value of 0 to the other variable - Profit. The 
same was done if the organization was for profit.  
Table ?? shows that 70 % of the MFIs are non profit organizations leaving the remaining 30  
as for profit organizations. 
 
Table 9.10 
 
 Statistics 
 
type  
Valid 229 N 
Missing 0 
 
 type 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 10 4,4 4,4 4,4 
2 54 23,6 23,6 27,9 
3 134 58,5 58,5 86,5 
4 27 11,8 11,8 98,3 
6 4 1,7 1,7 100,0 
Valid 
Total 229 100,0 100,0   
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9.6. Correlation 
 
Correlation describes a relationship between two random variables. This relationship has two 
measures: strength and direction.  Correlation coefficient ranges from –1 to 1. There is no 
exact answer to what size of the coefficient defines a strong relationship. For example, in a 
physics study with precise tools a coefficient of 0,9 can be too low (Wikipedia, 2008). In 
social sciences a coefficient below 0,3 is defined as low, from 0,3 to 0,5 as moderate and 
above 0,5 as strong.  The direction of the relationship is indicated by the sign of the 
correlation coefficient: “plus” stands for a positive relationship between the variables and 
“minus” - for negative. A correlation coefficient of 0 means that the variables are not related. 
A positive correlation means that as the values of the first variable increase, the values of the 
other variable tend also to increase. Likewise as the first variable decrease, so does the other 
variable. A negative correlation means that increase in the values of the first variable tend to 
decrease in the values of the second variable and the other way around. Figure 9.9 illustrates 
the discussed types of correlations. 
(http://blogs.ittoolbox.com/eai/implementation/archives/building-scatter-diagrams-15862) 
 
Figure 9.9 
 
Strong negative correlation   Weak negative correlation 
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Weak positive correlation   Strong positive correlation 
 
 
 No correlation 
 
 
There is a number of ways to calculate correlation between two variables: Pearson’s 
correlation, Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau-b. Non-symmetric or ordinal data require use 
of Spearman coefficient or Kendall'’s tau-b. Pearson coefficient is used for continuos 
symmetric data (SPSS).  It is obtained by dividing the covariance of the two variables by the 
product of their standard deviations (Wikipedia, 2008). 
 
Regression analysis helps us to find the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Multicollinearity is a problem that occurs when independent variables used in 
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research are highly correlated. They may measure the same thing thus measuring contribution 
of each variable can give misleading results. (SPSS, p.180). 
One of the ways to check for multicollinearity is to use a correlation matrix. Pearson 
correlation coefficient above 0,5 indicates strong relationships between the variables. Such 
cases will be given a special attention. A very high coefficient can be a sign of 
multicollinearity and such variables should not be used in the analysis. The value of Pearson’s 
r that signals potential multicollinearity is defined differently, but generally the limit goes 
between 0,7 and 0,9 (Online Econometrics Book, Regression Extensions, Detection of 
Multicollinearity, http://www.xycoon.com/detection.htm). In our study we will not use any 
variables with a correlation coefficient above 0,7. 
 
9.6. Comments to the Correlation Matrix 
 
Portfolio at Risk over 30 days 
There exists weak correlation between the variable and the average loan outstanding, assets 
rotation, operational self-sufficiency and reports rated by MicroRate and M-Cril. There is also 
a weak correlation with the reports from different regions. All these correlations are weak and 
require no special attention. 
 
Ln average Loan Outstanding 
The following variables show weak or moderate correlations: par30, ln_loan_outst_ave, 
ln_assets, assets rotation, all the regions and Microfinanza, Crisil and MCril. All these values 
are below 0,7 and can be used in the regression model.  
 
Operating Expense Ratio 
All correlations are below 0,7. Assets rotation is the only variable that has a strong correlation 
coefficient of 0,685. This means high operating expense ratio is found more often within 
MFIs with high assets rotation. 
 
Ln Assets 
The variable has some weak correlations. The only moderate correlation of –0,393 is with 
variable operating expense ratio. This is consistent with a fact that big MFIs have usually 
higher efficiency. 
 
  64
Assets Rotation 
The rotation ratio shows a few weak correlations to risk, outreach,  size and productivity 
indicators. There are exists also a strong correlation with efficiency indicator – operating 
expense ratio that was discussed earlier. Weak correlations exist with dummy variables MCril 
and LatinAmerica. 
 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 
All coefficients are within the limits. Only weak correlations exist with some of the variables. 
 
Agencies 
MicroRate, PlanetRating, Microfinanza, Crisil and MCril are dummy variables. MCril had 
two strong correlations. Pearson correlation of 0,546 with variable East Asia Pacific and of 
0,572 with variable South Asia. This is because only few ratings by this agency were used in 
this study and the ones that were used relate to MFIs operating in these regions. 
 
Regions 
EastAsiaPacific, EuropeCenAsia, LatinAmerica, MENA, South Asia and SubSahAfrica are 
also dummy variables. Only two strong correlations exist, both to variable MCril (see 
explanation above). 
 
Type 
NonProfit and Profit are dummy variables indicating whether MFI is profit driven. They 
indicate perfect negative correlation with each other. This will not be a problem in our case, 
since only 1 dummy variable is used in the regression (n-1). 
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Table 9.11 Correlation Matrix 
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10. Regression Analysis 
 
10.1 Basic regression model 
 
Once we studied theory on ratings, designed hypotheses, selected and checked the data, it is 
time to do the study. Our model consists of one dependent variable – rating grade and several 
independent variables, such as MFI size, profitability, efficiency, productivity, risk and 
outreach. Also a few dummy variables are created to check for whether there is a difference 
between what agency rated the MFI, where the MFI is located and whether it is profit driven. 
 
Regression analysis allows us to look at the effect between one independent and one or few 
independent variables. The basic regression model is a bivariate linear regression: 
 
Y = α + βX+ e 
(source: Business Research Methods, p.556) 
Where: 
Y = the dependent variable 
X = the independent (predictor) variable 
α = the Y intercept 
β = the slope coefficient 
e = the residual (difference between actual and estimated value of the dependent variable) 
 
This model represents a straight-line relationship. To better understand the model, let’s look at 
figure 10.1. 
 
Figure 10.1. Linear regression model with one independent variable.  
Y 
 
 
 
       β = ∆Y 
α ∆X 
                            X 
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The intercept α shows where regression line intersects the Y-axis. If the independent variable 
X is equal to zero and β is the slope coefficient, then  the dependent variable Y is equal to α.  
In our case the dependent variable Y is MFI’s rating. MFI size is the independent variable. If  
β equals 0,5, then increase of MFI size by 1 would cause the rating to increase by 0,5. If 
institution’s size were equal to zero, then the rating would also be equal to zero.  
 
 
10.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Our model suggests that rating depends not on one, but on several factors.  Multiple 
regression analysis “allows for the simultaneous investigation of the effect of two or more 
independent variables on a single interval-scaled dependent variable” (Zikmund, 2003) 
 
Multiple regression equation is presented below: 
 
Y = α + β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+…+βnXn + e (Zikmund, 2003) 
 
Like in the previous model Y is the dependent variable and α is the intercept. The difference 
is that there are several slope coefficients β1, β2, β3…βn which measure the effect of each of the 
independent variables X1, X2, X3…Xn on the dependent variable Y. The residual e represents 
deviations in the dependent Y that isn’t explained by the regression. 
 
P-values help us to check whether a statistically significant relationship exists. P-value is the 
probability for the relationship to exist in our sample if there were no relationship in the 
population. (source: Muijs, p. 162). Usually a p-value of 0,05 indicates that a relationship is 
significant. In other words a p-value of 0,05 means that there is a 95% probability that the 
independent variable effects the model. 
 
Dummy Variables 
Dummy variables represent subgroups of the sample. 
(http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dummyvar.php). They enable us to check for the 
effect between different treatment groups. Dummy variables have a value of 0 or 1. A value 
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of 1 is means that the variable is in the treated group and a value of 0 - that the variable is in 
the control group. 
After adding a dummy variable to a multiple regression model with two independent variables 
will change the equation to: 
 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3D + e (Zikmund, 2003) 
 
Where D is a dummy variable. Dummy variables help us to understand whether being 
exposed to a special treatment group has the effect on the dependent. If n is a number of 
categories, then n-1 dummy variables should be included in the regression. If all the variables 
are added, they will explain each other and we will have a problem of multicollinearity. 
Figure ?? shows the effect of a dummy variable on the regression line. 
 
 
Figure 10.2 The effect of adding a dummy variable to a linear regression model 
 
      Y 
 
    D = 1 
 
α+β3         Shift  D = 0 
 
 
      α   
           X 
In our study we have two different groups. Those MFI that are non-profit organizations and 
those that are for profit. Then n-1 dummy variables would mean adding one dummy to our 
regression model. Assume that a dummy value of 1 refers to non-profit organizations and of 0 
to for profit organizations. When the value of our dummy variable is 1 (D = 1), the regression 
line shifts upward and crosses the Y-axis at a point α+β3. The new regression line represents 
MFI that are non-profit organizations.  When the dummy variable has a value of 0 (D = 0) 
then the regression line remains unchanged and represents for profit organizations. 
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10.3 Coefficient of Multiple Determination R2 
 
While p-values show us how the independent variables relate to the dependent whether there 
exists a significant relationship between each independent variable and the dependent, 
coefficient of multiple determination R2 helps us to see how the all of the independent 
variables together predict the outcome (source: Muijs, p.162). R2 shows what percentage of 
the variance in the dependent variable Y is explained by all the independent variables 
together. The value of this coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. If R2 has a value of 0,65, it means 
that our independent variables explain 65% of the variance in the dependent variable Y. 
Usually, more of the variation in Y can be explained by adding extra independent variables to 
the regression model (Zikmund, 2003). 
 
 
10.4. R2 adjusted 
 
When performing a study, we usually draw samples from the population. R2 adjusted is a 
correction coefficient to R2. It shows how well the model fits the whole population and not 
only our sample and is adjusted downwards. (Source: Muijs, p. 165). The coefficient will 
increase only if adding a new variable to the model will improve it more than expected by 
chance (wikipedia).   
 
We should be careful using R2 adjusted. It will only be helpful in explaining our model if the 
study was performed using a sample. If the research was done using the whole population, 
then using R2 adjusted will not provide more explanation than R2. (wikipedia) 
 
This study is done using a sample from the population. Therefore R2 adjusted will be used to 
measure how well the independent variables describe the amount of variance in the dependent 
variable – rating. The value of this coefficient also ranges from 0 to 1. Muijs (source? Muijs, 
p. 166) provides following guidelines to see if the model fits: 
Below 0,1:  poor fit 
0,11-0,3:  modest fit 
0,31-0,5:  moderate fit 
above 0,5:  strong fit 
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10.5 Regression Analysis of the Rating Function  
 
Regression Analysis with one independent variable. 
 
We start our analysis with the basic linear regression model described earlier. It shows the 
relationship between the dependent and one independent variables. The dependent variable in 
this research is the rating grade of the MFI. The first independent variable we will look at is 
total assets, which measures the MFI size. 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in the table below: 
 
Table 10.1. Regression analysis with one independent variable 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,481(a) ,231 ,228 ,1567 
a  Predictors: (Constant), ln_assets 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -,657 ,135   -4,878 ,000 1 
ln_assets ,073 ,009 ,481 8,259 ,000 
a  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
 
 
Coefficient of multiple determination R2 has a value of 23,1%. It means that total assets of 
MFIs explain 23,1% of the variance in rating grades. When we look at the adjusted R2 , we 
notice that the value decreases to 22,8%. Since we used a sample of the population in our 
study, it means that 22,8 % of the variance in rating grades in the population is explained by 
total assets. 
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The constant has a value of –0,657. This means that a MFI that has a ln_assets value of 0 has 
a rating of –0,657. B coefficient tells us that the rating grade will increase by 0,073 if 
ln_assets increase by 1 unit. This is presented in figure ??. 
 
Figure 10.3  Regression line with one independent variable - ln_assets 
 
        Rategrade1 
 
 
 
           β = 0,073 
   
      
-0,657     
ln_assets 
 
Our variables are measured in different scales, so we should look at Beta coefficient for better 
understanding of the effect size of the independent variable. It is a standardized coefficient, so 
the variables are measured on the same scale (Muijs, p.168). Beta has the highest value of 1 
and lowest value of 0. In our case, the standardized Beta coefficient is 0,481. 
 
Statistical significance of 0 means that our independent variable ln_assets is significant at the 
5% level.  
 
Regression Analysis with six independent variables 
 
Our regression model consists of six independent variables. These are: total assets as a 
measure of MFI’s size; PAR 30 as a measure of risk; operating expense ratio as a measure of 
efficiency; operating self sufficiency as  a measure of productivity; assets rotation as 
profitability measure and average loans outstanding as a measure of outreach. 
 
We have already looked at the relationship between MFI’s size and the rating grade. Let’s see 
how adding additional variables will influence our regression model. 
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Table10.2. Regression analysis with six independent variables 
 
Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,727(a) ,528 ,515 ,1235 
a  Predictors: (Constant), ln_loan_outst_ave, oper_self_suff, assets_rot, PAR30, ln_assets, operexp_portf 
 
  
Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -,399 ,147   -2,715 ,007 
ln_assets ,064 ,008 ,423 8,232 ,000 
PAR30 -,481 ,058 -,416 -8,229 ,000 
operexp_portf -,248 ,099 -,206 -2,503 ,013 
oper_self_suff ,086 ,031 ,156 2,757 ,006 
assets_rot ,277 ,104 ,195 2,654 ,009 
1 
ln_loan_outst_ave ,003 ,009 ,021 ,378 ,706 
a  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
 
Coefficient of multiple determination R2 has a value of 52,8% and the adjusted R2 has a value 
of 51,5%. Both values have increased compared to when we used only one independent 
variable in our regression model. It means that adding these extra variables helped us to 
explain more of the variance in our dependent variable – the rating grade.  
 
Now let’s take a closer look at the independent variables. B coefficients tell us by what value 
the rating grade will change if the independent variable changes by 1 unit. A risk measure 
PAR 30 has the highest B coefficient of –0,481, so the rating grade would decrease by 0,481 
if PAR30 increases by 1. Remember, that Beta coefficients are standardized so the variables 
are measured using the same scale. Though PAR30 has the highest B coefficient MFI size 
(ln_assets) has the strongest influence on the rating grade with the highest Beta coefficient of 
0,423. PAR30 has the second highest influence with a Beta coefficient of –0,416. 
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All but one variable are significant at the 5% level. This means that we can say with 95% 
confidence that ln_assets, PAR30, operexp_portf, oper_self_suff and assets_rot influence the 
rating grade. Variable ln_loan_outst_ave, which is an outreach measure, has a significance 
value of 0,706. This means that the variable is not significant in explaining the regression and 
should not be included in our model. 
 
The probability-probability (P-P) plot of regression standardized residual is presented in 
figure ?? below. X-axis represent observed cumulative probability and Y-axis represent 
theoretical expected cumulative probability. From the plot we can see that the observed value 
of the regression standardized residual fits the line well with only slight deviations. This 
means that the residual is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 10.4 
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The scatterplot of the regression standardized residual (figure ??) is presented below. The 
standardized residuals from our study are plotted against the predicted values from our model. 
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The scatter plot is spread and shows no pattern of decreasing or increasing with change in the 
predicted value. This means that the assumption of homoscedasticity (equal variance) is true.  
 
Figure 10.5 
 
Regression Standardized Residual
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Regression Analysis with all variables 
 
The data in our sample is gathered from rating reports performed by 5 major rating agencies. 
These rating agencies are MicroRate, Planet Rating, Microfinanza, Crisil and M-Cril. As 
mentioned earlier, both rating scales and methodologies differ through the agencies. All rating 
grades in our sample have been transformed into a standardized rating scale. Adding a dummy 
for the rating agencies may help to explain the model better. 
  
Another dummy used in this study is organization type. Previously MFIs were organized as 
non-profit institutions. In the last years the tendency has changed and more MFIs are 
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organized as (or transformed into) profit driven. One of the main arguments is that for profit 
institutions may achieve better financial results. Rating reports study the financial 
performance of the MFI and the organization itself with its mission and goals. Let’s see if 
adding a dummy for the MFI type will influence the model. 
 
MFIs in this study have been divided into 6 regions. They are: East Asia and the Pacific, 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. The microfinance industry differs through the regions. Microfinance in Latin 
America and well developed, while it is not so mature in Africa. Europe is characterized by 
higher loan sizes. Appendix ?? provides more information on the Microfinance in different 
regions. Therefore adding a dummy variable for regions may help explaining the variance in 
the rating grades. 
 
Table 10.3 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,817(a) ,667 ,642 ,1062 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Profit, Crisil, PAR30, Microfinanza, operexp_portf, SubSaharanAfrica, 
MiddleEast_NorthAfrica, EastAsia_Pacific, oper_self_suff, MicroRate, SouthAsia, ln_assets, Europe_CentralAsia, 
ln_loan_outst_ave, assets_rot, M-Cril 
b  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
 
 
Coefficients(a) 
 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
    B Std. Error Beta t 
 
Sig. 
1 (Constant) -,719 ,144   -4,996 ,000 
  ln_assets ,084 ,007 ,551 11,381 ,000 
  PAR30 -,357 ,057 -,309 -6,313 ,000 
  operexp_portf -,150 ,090 -,125 -1,677 ,095 
  oper_self_suff ,095 ,028 ,172 3,443 ,001 
  assets_rot ,246 ,101 ,173 2,423 ,016 
  ln_loan_outst_ave -,011 ,011 -,069 -1,041 ,299 
  MicroRate -,086 ,021 -,198 -4,080 ,000 
  Microfinanza ,059 ,020 ,146 2,984 ,003 
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  Crisil ,222 ,078 ,143 2,854 ,005 
  M-Cril ,061 ,045 ,114 1,348 ,179 
  EastAsia_Pacific -,008 ,045 -,014 -,186 ,852 
  Europe_CentralAsia ,059 ,023 ,132 2,600 ,010 
  MiddleEast_NorthAfrica ,029 ,039 ,036 ,762 ,447 
  SouthAsia -,035 ,060 -,048 -,589 ,557 
  SubSaharanAfrica -,037 ,026 -,072 -1,447 ,149 
  Profit -,001 ,017 -,003 -,071 ,944 
a  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
 
The new model explains 66,7% of the variance in the rating grade (R2). Taking into 
consideration that our study is made on the sample, the model explains 64,2% of the variance 
(adj R2). This is an improvement, since R2 had a value of 52,8% and the adjusted R2 had a 
value of 51,5% in the regression model before dummies were added. 
 
Let’s first take a look at the dummy variables. Variable Profit that explains organization type 
is insignificant. Four out of five dummy variables for region show no significance either. 
These are East Asia and the Pacific (sig. 0,852), Middle East and North Africa (sig. 0,447), 
South Asia (sig. 0,557) and Sub-Saharan Africa (sig. 0,149). Only dummy for Europe and 
Central Asia was found significant (sig. 0,010). Adding a dummy for rating agencies had 
more effect.  Only one dummy variable M-Cril is not significant (sig. 0,179). MicroRate 
indicates a negative relationship (B coefficient of –0,086 and sig. 0). Microfinanza (B 
coefficient 0,059 and sig. 0,003) and Crisil (B coefficient of 0,000 and sig. 0,005) indicate a 
positive relationship with the rating grade. 
 
As in previous model, variable PAR30 has the highest B coefficient (-0,357). Standardized 
Beta coefficient shows, however, that variable ln_assets has the highest effect on the rating 
grade. Beta coefficient for ln_assets is 0,551 and for PAR30 is -0,309. 
 
Now let’s look at the significance of the remaining variables. Variables ln_assets, PAR30, 
oper_self_suff and assets_rot have sig. values below 0,05. Variable ln_loan_outst_ave is not 
significant like in the previous model (sig. 0,299). Significance value of variable 
operexp_portf has increased from 0,013 to 0,095. This above 0,05, so the variable is not 
significant at the 5% level anymore. 
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The P-P plot of regression standardized residual (figure ??) shows some slight deviations 
between the observed and expected cumulative probabilities. Besides that, the values fit the 
straight-line fine and the residual is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 10.6 
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Figure ?? shows the scatterplot of the regression standardized residual. The values are 
scattered and no specific pattern is observed. The assumption of homoscedasticity is met.  
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Figure 10.7 
Regression Standardized Residual
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Results from SPSS show that only half (8 out of 16) of the independent variables were 
significant in explaining the model. To improve our regression the following variables will be 
deleted: ln_loan_outst_ave, EastAsia_Pacific, MiddleEast_NorthAfrica, SouthAsia, 
SubSaharanAfrica and Profit. They all had sig. value above 0,05.  
 
Deleting all insignificant variables from the model gave R2 of 63,8% and adj R2 of 62,5%. 
That is a decrease compared to the model with all the variables. 
 
Table 10.4 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,799(a) ,638 ,625 ,1092 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Europe_CentralAsia, ln_assets, PAR30, oper_self_suff, assets_rot, Microfinanza, 
MicroRate, Crisil 
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b  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
After deleting the insignificant dummy variables for region, agency and MFI type, variable 
operexp_portf became significant (table ??). The outreach measure remained insignificant 
(sig. 0,448). Therefore it was deleted from the model. Table below presents results from the 
regression with and without variable ln_loan_outst_ave. After deleting the variable from the 
model the significant values of other variables changed only slightly. All the variables 
remained significant and were kept. 
 
Table 10.5 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
Model 
 
t Sig. t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -5,273 ,000 -5,939 ,000 
  ln_assets 11,687 ,000 11,410 ,000 
  PAR30 -6,954 ,000 -7,302 ,000 
  operexp_portf -1,972 ,050 -1,939 ,054 
  oper_self_suff 3,449 ,001 3,688 ,000 
  assets_rot 3,177 ,002 3,340 ,001 
  MicroRate -4,453 ,000 -4,380 ,000 
  Microfinanza 3,144 ,002 3,129 ,002 
  Crisil 3,212 ,002 3,550 ,000 
  M-Cril 2,002 ,047 2,628 ,009 
  Europe_CentralAsia 2,612 ,010 2,537 ,012 
  ln_loan_outst_ave -,759 ,448   
 
With loan_outst_ave Without loan_outst_ave 
 
 
All results from the new regression model are presented in table ??. 
 
Table 10.6 
 Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,809(a) ,655 ,639 ,1071 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Europe_CentralAsia, ln_assets, Crisil, M-Cril, PAR30, oper_self_suff, MicroRate, 
assets_rot, Microfinanza, operexp_portf 
b  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
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 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -,761 ,128   -5,939 ,000 
ln_assets ,080 ,007 ,531 11,410 ,000 
PAR30 -,374 ,051 -,321 -7,302 ,000 
Operexp_portf -,156 ,080 -,129 -1,939 ,054 
oper_self_suff ,100 ,027 ,181 3,688 ,000 
Assets_rot ,309 ,093 ,217 3,340 ,001 
MicroRate -,088 ,020 -,203 -4,380 ,000 
Microfinanza ,061 ,019 ,150 3,129 ,002 
Crisil ,224 ,063 ,143 3,550 ,000 
M-Cril ,064 ,024 ,118 2,628 ,009 
1 
Europe_CentralAsia ,054 ,021 ,119 2,537 ,012 
a  Dependent Variable: rategrade1 
 
The new model explains 63,9% of the variance in the rating grade (R2 = 65,5% and adj R2 = 
63,9%). This is a slight decrease compared to the model with all independent variables, which 
explained 64,2% of the variance in the rating grade. 
Variable PAR30 has the strongest B coefficient, while variable ln_assets has the strongest 
Beta coefficient followed by variable PAR30. This  was the result in previous models too and 
was commented earlier. 
 
The number of significant independent variables increased from eight to ten. The constant is 
also significant. Removing the variable from the model decreased the values of R2 to 65,5% 
and adj R2 to 63,9%. 
 
The normal P-P plot shows that our observed values of cumulative probability improved 
compared to the model when all variables were included. The observed values fit the line 
well. 
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Figure 10.8 
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Scatterplot represented below shows no specific tendencies and the assumption of equal 
variance is met.  
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Figure 10.9 
Regression Standardized Residual
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11. Results  
 
Before we ca reject or support our hypotheses, we should define our decision criteria. The 
probability between choosing the null and the alternative hypotheses is called significance 
level (Zikmund 2003). We should reject the null hypotheses if the relationship is significant 
and accept the null hypotheses if the relationship is insignificant. Now let’s determine what 
type of test we will use. A one-tailed test is used to test the relationship and it’s direction 
between the variables. That is whether the variables are positively or negatively related. A 
two-tailed test is used only to determine whether that relationship exists, and does not define 
its direction. A graphical illustration of a one-tailed and a two-tailed tests is provided below. 
 
Figure 11.1 
 
 
 
 
 5%           2,5%      2,5% 
 
 
One-tailed test          Two-tailed test 
 
If test results fall into the critical regions, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis.  These two tests can be done using different significance levels (ex. 
1%, 5%). It is common to use a 5% significance level in social sciences. It means that there is 
a 5% chance to reject the null hypothesis even if it’s true. If the p-value (0,050 for a 5% 
significance level) is less than the significance level, it will fall into the shaded area and the 
null hypothesis should be rejected. SPSS usually provides p-values based on a two-tailed test. 
If the t-value is below –1,645 (for negatively related variables) or above 1,645 (for positively 
related variables), then the null hypotheses should be rejected. In a one-tailed tests, the t-value 
has critical value of +/- 1,96 and does not depend on the direction of the relationship.  
Since our hypotheses state the relationship and its direction between the variables, a two-
tailed test will be used. As a decision criterion we will use a 5% significance level. To 
determine whether the variables are significant or not, we will use p-values and t-values.  
 
  85
Hypothesis 1: Size and Rating 
 
H10: There is no relationship between MFI size and the rating grade. 
H1A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI size and the rating grade. 
 
Variable ln_assets is used as a measure of MFI size. The B coefficient of 0,080 shows that the 
rating grade will increase by 0,080 if ln_assets increases by 1. This indicates a positive 
relationship between the variable and the rating grade. Variable ln_assets is significant at the 
5% level with a significance value of 0,000 and t-value of 11,410. A positive significant 
relationship between the MFI size and the rating has been proven.  
 
We reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Risk and Rating 
 
H20: There is no relationship between MFI risk and the rating grade. 
H2A: A negative and significant relationship exists between MFI risk and the rating grade.  
 
MFI risk is represented in its portfolio quality. Results from SPSS show that an increase in 
PAR30, which is a measure of portfolio quality, by 1 unit would cause the rating grade to 
decrease by 0,374 (B coefficient is –0,374).  This indicates that the risk and rating grade are 
negatively related. The significance value is 0,000 (which is lower than 0,050) and t-value is -
7,302. Therefore we can say that a significant negative relationship exists between MFI risk 
and the rating grade. 
 
We reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Efficiency and Productivity 
 
H30: There is no relationship between MFI efficiency and productivity and the rating grade. 
H3A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI efficiency and productivity 
and the rating grade. 
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Operating expense ratio measures the cost of providing loans. Thus lower ratio indicates 
higher efficiency. B coefficient of –0,156 shows that the rating grade will decrease by –0,156 
if the ratio increases by 1 unit. Since lower ratio means higher efficiency, then efficiency is 
positively related to the rating grade. The results show a p-value of 0,054. The t-value of  -
1,939 is below the critical value of –1,654 for a two-tailed test for negatively related 
variables. Therefore the value is significant in explaining the model. 
Variable operational self-sufficiency is a productivity measure. A value of 1 and above means 
that MFI is able to cover its costs from the revenue. The B coefficient is positive with a value 
of 0,100 showing that the value of the rating grade would change by 0,100 if the variable 
changes by 1 unit. This shows a positive relationship between the variable and the rating 
grade. Significance value is 0,000, which is below 0,050. 
We conclude that a significant positive relationship exists between MFI efficiency and 
productivity and the rating grade. 
 
We reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
   
Hypothesis 4: Profitability 
 
H40: There is no relationship between MFI profitability. 
H4A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI profitability and the rating 
grade. 
 
Variable assets rotation was chosen as an indicator of MFI profitability. An increase in the 
variable by 1 would cause the rating grade to increase by 0,309 (Beta coefficient 0,309). This 
shows a positive relationship with the dependent variable. Significance value is below 0,50 
(sig. 0,001) and the t-value is above 1,654 (t 3,340). The variable is significant in explaining 
the model at the 95% confidence level. 
A significant positive relationship between MFI profitability and the rating grade has been 
proven. 
 
We reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Social Performance 
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H50: There is no relationship between MFI social performance and the rating grade. 
H5A: A positive and significant relationship exists between MFI social performance and the 
rating grade. 
 
Loan outstanding average was chosen as a measure of outreach. The smaller the loan sizes, 
the poorer the clients that are served by the MFI. Thus a negative relationship between the 
variable and dependent grade would indicate that social performance has positive effect on the 
rating grade. Since the variable was not significant, it was deleted from the final model. 
However I would like to comment the results of the findings in the model with all variables 
(table ??). The B coefficient of –0,011 shows that the rating grade would drop by 0,011 if the 
variables increased by 1. In other words providing loans to poorer customers would increase 
the MFI rating grade. This relationship was however not found significant (sig. 0,299 and t –
0,759). The model before the control variables were added shows an insignificant positive 
relationship (B coefficient 0,003 and sig.0,706) (table ??). The final model with the variable 
shows an insignificant negative relationship (B coefficient -0,00 and sig.0,448). (table ??). 
The model did not prove that there exists a significant positive relationship between social 
performance and the rating grade. 
 
We accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis. 
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12. Discussion 
 
In this part of the paper we will take a closer look at the results of the model. We will discuss 
whether empirical testing confirmed our hypotheses. The influence with regard to each of the 
variables in the regression will be discussed. We’ll compare the results with previous studies. 
 
To test whether our hypotheses are confirmed by the data, we used multiple regression 
analysis. As discussed in previously, the multiple regression equation has the following form: 
 
Y = α + β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+…+βnXn + e (Zikmund 2003) 
 
Now let’s fill inn the computations from this study. All information will be taken from table 
??, that shows the results from the final regression model. The full model was based on 16 
variables. Six of these variables were used in the hypotheses, the remaining 10 were used as 
control variables. After substituting the variables from our final model, the equation looks like 
this: 
 
Rating = α + β1ln_assets + β2PAR30 + β3operexp_portf + β4oper_self_suff  + β5assets_rot +   
β6MicroRate + β7Microfinanza + β8Crisil + β9MCril + β10Europe_CentralAsia 
 
The final equation consists of 10 variables. The empirical testing showed that they are 
significant in explaining the variance in MFI rating grade. β coefficients measure the effect of 
each individual variable. A negative coefficient means that an increase (decrease) in the 
variable will cause the rating grade to decrease (increase). A positive coefficient means that 
an increase (decrease) in the variable will cause the rating grade to increase (decrease). The 
equation after adding β coefficients is presented below: 
 
Rating = -0,761 + 0,080*ln_assets – 0,374*PAR30 – 0,156*operexp_portf + 
0,100*oper_self_suff 
 
+ 0,309*assets_rot – 0,088*MicroRate
 
+
 
0,061*Microfinanza
 
+ 
0,224*Crisil +
 
0,064*MCril+ 0,054*Europe_CentralAsia 
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Let’s do some computations to find out the rating grade based on the mean values of our 
variables. Most of the MFI in our data are non-profit and operate in Latin America. Planet 
Rating performed their rating, therefore control variables will have a value of 0. 
  
Rating = -0,761 + 0,080*15,236 – 0,374*0,410 – 0,156*0,502 + 0,100*1,181
 
+ 0,309*0,266 
– 0,088*0
 
+
 
0,061*0
 
+ 0,224*0 +
 
0,064*0+ 0,054*0 = -0,761 + 1,219 – 0,153 – 0,078 + 
0,118 + 0,082 = 0,427 
 
We’ll refer to the rating of 0,427 as a basic rating. Let’s take a closer look at the effect of each 
variable and compare it to our hypotheses. To see how each variable influences the rating, 
we’ll use examples with minimum, maximum and mean values of our variables. 
 
Size 
Our alternative hypotheses states that MFI size is positively related with the rating grade. 
Results of our study support this(β = 0,080). An increase in ln_assets by 1 would cause the 
MFI rating to increase by 0,080. Though the β coefficient is rather small, size is the variable 
that affects the rating the most (Beta 0,531, t 11,410). 
Positive relationship between size and rating is also supported by previous studies. Larger 
MFI tend to get higher ratings. They should be better in meeting their commitments and 
managing risks. Larger MFI usually benefit from economies of scales and have experienced 
staff.  
 
Risk 
Our regression model shows that portfolio at risk is negatively related to the rating grade (β = 
-0,374). High values of portfolio at risk indicate that a high number of loans is overdue (over 
30 days for PAR30). Such MFI will suffer from low portfolio quality and will be considered 
more risky. The results from regression model confirmed our alternative hypotheses. An 
increase in portfolio in risk will cause the rating grade to decrease. 
An MFI that has no portfolio overdue (PAR30 = 0) will get a rating grade that is 0,187 points 
higher compared to an MFI with half of it’s portfolio overdue 30 days (PAR30 = 0,5) if all the 
other variables are the same (-0,374*0 - (-0,374*0,5) = 0,187). 
Efficiency and Productivity 
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Our hypothesis states that efficiency and productivity are positively related to the MFI rating 
grade. The lower the operating expense ratio, the higher the efficiency. Let’s look at the effect 
of high efficiency and productivity on the rating grade. To do a comparison, we’ll use mean 
and a minimum value for variable operexp_portf and a maximum value for variable 
oper_self_suff . The rating grade of an MFI with maximum efficiency and productivity 
compared to the mean would be 0,168 points higher (0,208-,04) if all other variables are 
equal. 
Rating = -0,156*,502 + 0,1*1,18 = 0,04  mean efficiency and productivity 
Rating = -0,156*0,168 + 0,1*2,34 = 0,208  max efficiency and productivity 
The results from the model confirm the alternative hypotheses. 
 
Profitability 
We used assets rotation as a measure of profitability. The results of the research show that the 
variable is positively related with the rating grade. Let’s look at an example using mean and 
max profitability values. It will help us to compare the rating grade of an average MFI and the 
one with maximum profitability using the values from our data. An MFI with max 
profitability will have a rating grade than is 0,113 points higher than an MFI with mean 
profitability from our data (0,309*0,630- 0,309*,266 = 0,113). This is also supported by our 
hypotheses. 
 
Outreach 
The alternative hypothesis stated that outreach was positively related to rating. The empirical 
testing did not prove this and the null hypothesis was accepted. Though the variable 
ln_loan_outst_ave was not significant, the β coefficient was negative in the full model and 
before it was deleted from the final model. It was, however, positive in the model before 
control variables were added. This is, of course, not a result worth making an estimation, but 
there might be a tendency for MFI with higher outreach (thus lower variable) to get higher 
ratings. 
 
Previous studies find positive relation between companies’ social and financial performance. 
(Margolis and Walsch, 2001). Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca (2007) study try to prove 
that social performance has positive effect on the MFI rating, but find no empirical evidence 
for that. 
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Due to a unique nature of MFI aiming to meet “the double bottom line” (social and financial 
goals), I believe that outreach should affect the rating grade. This model did not prove this. 
Since rating reports done by different agencies do not provide the same amount on social 
performance, using different indicators could give different results. 
 
Control variables 
 
Region 
To check for the possible effect of the region where the MFI operate we added a control 
variable to our regression model. Out of six regions, only Europe and Central Asia was 
significant. The results of our study show that if an MFI operates in that region, the rating 
grade will be 0,054 points higher compared to MFI that operates in other parts of the world (if 
other variables are the same). With a basic rating grade of 0,427, the new rating grade would 
then be 0,481. None of the other regions were significant in explaining the model. Our data 
had a very high number of cases from Latin America (46%). The number of MFIs from 
Europe and Central Asia was also rather high (19,1%). Testing the model on a sample with 
more cases from other regions could give different results. Income, education and political 
situation in the region may influence the results.  
 
Agency 
Since the ratings were performed by different agencies another control variable for agency 
was added to our model. All of the dummy variables are significant in explaining the model. 
Let’s look at the effect of each agency. Remember that our basic rating grade was calculated 
for an MFI rated by Planet Rating. Then a rating performed by MicroRate will be 0,088 points 
lower that is 0,339. Microfinanza will provide a grade of 0,488, which is 0,061 points higher. 
Crisil will give a rating that is 0,224 points higher from our basic model. This rating grade of 
0,651 is the highest compared to the other agencies. We had only a few cases rated by the 
agency, so the effect could be different if more cases were added. If M-Cril performs a rating 
instead of Planet Rating in our basic model, then the rating grade will be 0,064 higher with a 
value of 0,491. As we notice, adding a control variable for agencies was useful in explaining 
the MFI rating.  There are a few possible explanations to this effect. One is that the rating 
scale used to transform the grades could explain the difference in the grades. Another one is 
that different agencies give more weight to some indicators compared to others. We already 
discussed in our paper that the agencies use different methodologies. 
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Type 
The last control variable in our model is profit. It wasn’t significant in explaining the 
relationship and was deleted from our final model. This means that it doesn’t affect the rating 
grade whether the MFI is non-profit or for profit. Only data on MFI from Latin America was 
used. Our study used MFI from all over the world and found no relationship between the non-
profit/profit motive and the MFI rating. The basic rating in our model would be unchanged 
with a rating grade of 0,427. 
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13. Conclusion 
Microfinance rating is an important step on the way to transparency. Donors, investors and 
MFI clients need accurate and reliable information about MFI performance. Ratings would 
help MFI to benchmark and compare their performance with peers. 
 
In order to find what factors influence the rating of the MFI, an empirical research was 
conducted. To do this we defined 6 hypotheses based on theory and previous findings. These 
stated the relationship between the rating grade and the following factors: MFI size, risk, 
productivity and efficiency, profitability and outreach. Our data was based on the rating 
reports by 5 major rating agencies. The MFI rated were located in different countries. 
Therefore control variables for agency and region were added. With the growing tendency 
towards organizing (or transforming) MFI as for profit institutions, one more control variable 
was added. It would measure the possible effect of non-profit motive. 
 
The results of empirical research showed that MFI size has the most effect on the rating grade. 
It is positively connected to the rating grade showing that larger MFI tend to get better rating 
grades. Risk is the measure that explains the next most variance in the rating grade. Its β 
coefficient is negative, so riskier MFI get lower rating grades. Efficiency, productivity and 
profitability measures were significant in explaining rating grades. They all showed positive 
relationship as stated in the hypotheses. The model did not, however, prove that there exists a 
significant positive relationship between social performance and the MFI ratings. The variable 
was not found significant and was deleted from the final model. Possible explanations of that 
were discussed in previous chapter. Analysis showed that adding control variables for agency 
were helpful in explaining the variance in the rating grade. All of the dummy variables were 
significant. It didn’t affect the rating grade whether MFI were non-profit or profit motivated. 
A positive significant relationship was found between the MFI from Europe and Central Asia. 
None of the other regions were significant in explaining the model. 
 
Larger, less risky, more efficient, more productive and more profitable MFI tend to get better 
rating grades. It doesn’t matter how they are organized (profit motivated or not) or what 
region they operate in (except for Europe and Central Asia that has positive effect on the 
rating grade). It does, however, matter what agency performed the rating. We should be 
careful about making a conclusion, since transforming rating grades into a standardized scale 
could’ve caused that.  
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14. Critics 
 
Not much research is done on the MFI ratings. Many of the previous studies used in stating 
the hypotheses come from theory on bond ratings, bank ratings, social performance of firms. 
Usage of more theory and empirical studies on MFI ratings could possibly help us to identify 
other important factors that influence the rating grades assigned to MFI. 
 
The data used in this research came from rating reports available for publicity through the 
Rating Fund. It is possible that there is a higher number of the MFI that needed to be rated 
(due to government regulations or request from funders) than those that did it voluntary. 
 
Five major rating firms performed the ratings. They are not equally represented. Planet Rating 
did 37,9% of the rating reports, while Crisil did 1,3%. All agencies, but one operate globally. 
Crisil operates in South Asia only. 
 
The number of cases between the regions is not equally distributed either. Almost half of the 
MFI in the data operate in Latin America compared to approximately 5% that operate in 
Middle East and North Africa. 
 
Previously not all rating reports included a rating grade. The ones without an overall rating 
grade were not used in the study.  
 
Only indicators that were available through rating reports for all agencies were used. 
Improving the reports and providing information could help to find the variables that would 
improve the results. 
 
The research was conducted assuming that all the data in the rating reports was correct. The 
MFI could provide untrue or withhold some information in order to achieve a better rating. 
 
More research on the microfinance ratings should be carried out. A special attention should be 
given to social performance. Finding better indicators could give different results. When 
controlling for region and agency effects more data should be used, so no variables are clearly 
outnumbered. 
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